Does state ownership of banks hinder financial development and economic growth in emerging markets?
This paper provides empirical analysis of macroeconomic effects of state ownership of banks. The aim is to test one of the key findings of theoretical and empirical literature of 1990s and early 2000s, namely that sizeable state ownership of commercial
banks hinders financial development and economic growth. We focus on several large emerging markets including BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and test several specific hypotheses for the period from 1995 through 2009. Our results suggest that positive or negative sign of the government ownership impact on financial intermediation and economic growth is not constant for all times but varies depending on the type of national economy (mature market or emerging market) and, within the emerging markets category, on the level of economic development. The impact is therefore heterogeneous and not homogeneous. This finding is in contrast with the established theory but in line with the most recent empirical literature.
The conference is organized in collaboration with Polish Economic Society Branch in Toruń and Brno University of Technology (Czech Republic), BA School of Business and Finance (Latvia), Daugavpils University (Lithuania), Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky Hryhoriy Skovoroda State Pedagogical University (Ukraine), University of Angers (France), University of Pablo de Olavide (Spain), University of Latvia (Latvia). The conference is addressed to economist from all European Union countries and Eastern Europe. It aims to bring together economists form Western, Central and Eastern Europe to discuss issues in economics, finance and business management. Main conference tracks include: 1. Macroeconomics; Microeconomics; Econometrics; International Economics 2. Financial markets; Labour markets; Institutions; 3. Business environment; Management and Marketing.
This article evaluates the peculiarities of current corporate ratings systems and addresses specific issues of the development of econometrical rating models for emerging market enterprises. Financial indicators, market-value appraisals, industrial as well as macroeconomic factors of different countries were used as explanatory variables. Ratings of the Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings agencies were considered and used for modelling. The predictive power of the econometrical models was examined. A comparison of the methodologies of the three leading agencies was discussed.
As there is still no substantial research evidence on the mediating effect of innovativeness on market orientation – performance link in emerging economies, our study aims to close this gap. Following existing theory, direct and indirect effects of market orientation on firm performance are being tested. The model includes moderating effect of product innovativeness. The paper aims at adding to existing theory on the role of firm innovativeness in driving firm performance with the focus on product innovation. Product innovation is in center of attention for emerging economies, while Russia is rather loosing positions in producing innovative offerings in comparison to other BRIC economies. The study is based on empirical survey of 204 Russian innovative firms with multiple respondents approach, resulting in 331 qualified respondents. The results confirm existing differences, depending on the level of product innovativeness, as well as illustrate variation in the role of market orientation subdimensions and dimensions of product innovation on firm performance.
The capacity for transformation and advancement of the world economy itself by a group of countries belonging to the emerging economies has been a topic of intense discussion in world forums. Even as news of the losing shimmer of the emerging economies is being spilled to the world, this is where 80% of the world consumers reside, and, therefore, too important to divert attention from. The theme of the 2014 Annual Conference of the Emerging Marketing Conference Board hosted by Centre for Marketing in Emerging Economies of IIM Lucknow, supported by the Academy of Indian Marketing – Listening to Consumers of Emerging Markets is an eminent testimony to this important fact.
JAGDISH N SHETH, PHD
Emory University Founder, Academy of Indian Marketing
The chapter describes the current state of corporate governance in Russia and the dynamics of recent years. Important features of the environment that affect corporate governance include weak legal institutions that lead to high private benefits to control, underdeveloped capital markets, high levels of ownership concentration and significant state involvement in business. In this situation, the main conflict of interest is not between a manager and a large number of dispersed shareholders, but between large and small shareholders, between different large shareholders, and between minority shareholders and managers/board members in state-owned companies. Many of these features are very similar to other emerging markets, but substantially different from conditions faced by firms in developed countries. Despite substantial improvement during the 2000s, the quality of corporate governance in Russia is still much lower than in developed countries, primarily because of the low quality of Russian institutions.
The chapter discussed the problems of the Russia’s economic competitiveness in the booming years prior to 2008 economic crisis. We estimate the competitive advantages and weaknesses, and analyze the contribution of innovations into the growth dynamics pattern.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. We distinguish between banks that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
This article provides empirical analysis of the macroeconomic effects of state presence in the financial sector. We develop a set of criteria and execute statistical estimates of the phenomenon based on BRIC country-level data. We assume that at macro-level negative effects of state presence are not indisputable but considerably depend on the country's stage of economic development. According to our estimates government control over banking industry might stimulate financial intermediation only if economic development is low. In terms of other economic development indicators we conclude that for low-income countries state presence might impede investment activity and productivity growth but as the economy develops these effects flicker out or even reverse.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.