A Multi-Stage Model of Searching for Two Mobile Objects on a Graph
We are dealing with a search game where one searcher looks for two mobile objects on a graph. The searcher distributes his searching resource so as to maximize the probability of detecting at least one of the mobile objects. Each mobile object minimizes its own probability of being found. In this problem the Nash equilibrium, i.e. the optimal transition probabilities of the mobile objects and the optimal values of the searcher’s resource, was found. The value of the game in a single-stage search game with non-exponential payoff functions was found.
We use the vertical differentiation framework to explore the quality - price competition in the insurance market.
This paper explores the intertwining of uncertainty and values. We consider an important but underexplored field of fundamental uncertainty and values in decision-making. Some proposed methodologies to deal with fundamental uncertainty have included potential surprise theory, scenario planning and hypothetical retrospection. We focus on the principle of uncertainty transduction in hypothetical retrospection as an illustrative case of how values interact with fundamental uncertainty. We show that while uncertainty transduction appears intuitive in decision contexts it nevertheless fails in important ranges of strategic game-theoretic cases. The methodological reasons behind the failure are then examined.
In this paper, we study the Maximum Happy Vertices and the Maximum Happy Edges problems (MHV and MHE for short). Very recently, the problems attracted a lot of attention and were studied in Agrawal ’17, Aravind et al. ’16, Choudhari and Reddy ’18, Misra and Reddy ’17. Main focus of our work is lower bounds on the computational complexity of these problems. Established lower bounds can be divided into the following groups: NP-hardness of the above guarantee parameterization, kernelization lower bounds (answering questions of Misra and Reddy ’17), exponential lower bounds under the Set Cover Conjecture and the Exponential Time Hypothesis, and inapproximability results. Moreover, we present an O∗(ℓk)O∗(ℓk) randomized algorithm for MHV and an O∗(2k)O∗(2k) algorithm for MHE, where ℓℓ is the number of colors used and k is the number of required happy vertices or edges. These algorithms cannot be improved to subexponential taking proved lower bounds into account.
This contributed volume presents the state-of-the-art of games and dynamic games, featuring several chapters based on plenary sessions at the ISDG-China Chapter Conference on Dynamic Games and Game Theoretic Analysis, which was held from August 3-5, 2017 at the Ningbo campus of the University of Nottingham, China. The chapters in this volume will provide readers with paths to further research, serving as a testimony to the vitality of the field. Experts cover a range of theory and applications related to games and dynamic games.
This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018) held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018.
This paper discusses the scientific and practical perspectives of using general game playing in business-to-business price negotiations as a part of Procurement 4.0 revolution. The status quo of digital price negotiations software, which emerged from intuitive solutions to business goals and refereed to as electronic auctions in industry, is summarized in a scientific context. Description of such aspects as auctioneers’ interventions, asymmetry among players and time- depended features reveals the nature of nowadays electronic auctions to be rather termed as price games. This paper strongly suggests general game playing as the crucial technology for automation of human rule setting in those games. Game theory, genetic programming, experimental economics, and AI human player simulation are also discussed as satellite topics. SIDL-type game descriptions languages and their formal game-theoretic foundations are presented.
Game theory has recently become a useful tool for modeling and studying various networks. The past decade has witnessed a huge explosion of interest in issues that intersect networks and game theory. With the rapid growth of data traffic, from any kind of devices and networks, game theory is requiring more intelligent transformation. Game theory is called to play a key role in the design of new generation networks that are distributed, self-organizing, cooperative, and intelligent. This book consists of invited and technical papers of GAMENETS 2018, and contributed chapters on game theoretic applications such as networks, social networks, and smart grid.
The majority of social and economic interactions take place between people of different social status. Age, position, income and other factors affect the way people evaluate their position in the society. We investigate how self-estimation of the social status is formed when an individual participates in an economic experimental game. In our experiment subjects are set in pairs and play consequently the dictator game, the trust game and the labor market (contract) game. After each game we measure their subjective socioeconomic status using two different scales. We show that participation in the dictator game affects the perception of one’s social status to the greatest extent: the status of dictators is higher than the status of recipients. Prescription of roles in other games does not have such an effect. Active behavior, gender, income, etc. also affect the subjective status.
The Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2010 was awarded jointly to Peter Diamond from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dale Mortensen from Northwestern University and Christopher Pissarides from London School of Economics and Political Science «for fundamental contributions to search and matching theory», established in 70-80s of the last century, and constituting now the core of modern economics. The most important application of this approach has become the analysis of labour market with search costs or «frictions» that potential workers and firms face in their attempts to locate each other. The original approach has provided the basis for the study of equilibrium unemployment dynamics in terms of flow variables (eg. monthly measured numbers of new vacancies and unemployed, hired and fired workers, etc.). It has enabled researchers to conduct both positive and normative analysis of the labour market and social welfare in terms of concrete policy measures and instruments, such as unemployment benefits, hiring and firing costs, minimum wage laws, etc.