Факторы электоральной лояльности республик в составе РФ на федеральных выборах: постановка проблемы и первые результаты.
We analyze political economy of Russian Vertical-of-Power in federal-regional aspects. In the year 2008 in Russia new president (the formal head of Russian government) was elected, in the next elections to come in the 2012 most probably that Putin is going to return his formal presidential chair. In this paper we test if governor appointed by new president followed by extra federal money (extra payments from federal budget to regional budget). There are two hypotheses: if new governor appointed by new president leads to significant increase in payments from federal budget to regional budget or there were no changes in payments from federal budget to regional budget. The data analysis confirms the first hypothesis.
In this paper we study convergence among Russian regions. We find that while there was no convergence in 1990s, the situation changed dramatically in 2000s. While interregional GDP per capita gaps still persist, the differentials in incomes and wages decreased substantially. We show that fiscal redistribution did not play a major role in convergence. We therefore try to understand the phenomenon of recent convergence using panel data on the interregional reallocation of capital and labor. We find that capital market in Russian regions is integrated in a sense that local investment does not depend on local savings. We also show that economic growth and financial development has substantially decreased the barriers to labor mobility. We find that in 1990s many poor Russian regions were in a poverty trap: potential workers wanted to leave those regions but could not afford to finance the move. In 2000s (especially in late 2000s), these barriers were no longer binding. Overall economic development allowed even poorest Russian regions to grow out of the poverty traps. This resulted in convergence in Russian labor market; the interregional gaps in incomes, wages and unemployment rates are now below those in Europe. The results imply that economic growth and development of financial and real estate markets eventually result in interregional convergence.
This work looks at a model of spatial election competition with two candidates who can spend effort in order to increase their popularity through advertisement. It is shown that under certain condition the political programs of the candidates will be different. The work derives the comparative statics of equilibrium policy platform and campaign spending with respect the distribution of voter policy preferences and the proportionality of the electoral system. In particular, it is whown that the equilibrium does not exist if the policy preferences are distributed over too narrow an interval.