Равновесия в игре на сети с производством и экстерналиями
This paper studies a model of game interaction with externalities on a network, in which agents choose their level of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that in both cases agents may be passive, active and hyperactive, and conditions for optimality of these types of behavior are derived. In particular, we study the case of a full homogeneous network and show that an increase in its size facilitates active state of agents but reduces their utility.
The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.
We consider the dependence of the growth arte on the elasticity of substitution within the framework of a model with the agents' mutual dependence. This model is interpreted as a network structure. the development is explined as the agents' valus increase in a dynamic system described by functions which display constant elasticity of substitution (CES). We investigate the cases of high and low complementarity of activities. In particular, we receive conditions allowing to identify the cases when the elasticity of substitution has the positive (negative) effect on growth rate under high (low) complementarity of activities. Additionally we analyse the influence of the individual agent's productivities on the growth rate. Finally we give a potential generalisation of the model allowing for different growth rates of the agents.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The main optimality concept for such games is concept of equilibrium. We introduce a notion of homomorphism for games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points of games which are in a homomorphic relation. The main result is finding covariantly and contravariantly complete families of homomorphisms.
The ninth issue of annual Collection of articles consists of four sections: “Analysis of actual economic processes”, “Modeling of financial and market mechanisms”, “Dynamic models”, “Discussions, Notes and Letters”. As a whole nine articles are presented
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or region, what conditions affect it and how the level of future investments in knowledge can be predicted.
This proceedings publication is a compilation of selected contributions from the “Third International Conference on the Dynamics of Information Systems” which took place at the University of Florida, Gainesville, February 16–18, 2011. The purpose of this conference was to bring together scientists and engineers from industry, government, and academia in order to exchange new discoveries and results in a broad range of topics relevant to the theory and practice of dynamics of information systems. Dynamics of Information Systems: Mathematical Foundation presents state-of-the art research and is intended for graduate students and researchers interested in some of the most recent discoveries in information theory and dynamical systems. Scientists in other disciplines may also benefit from the applications of new developments to their own area of study.
For n person games with preference relations some types of optimality solutions are introduced. Elementary properties of their solutions are considered. One sufficient condition for nonempty Ca-core is found.