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Regular version of the site

Book chapter

Равновесия в игре на сети с производством и экстерналиями

С. 77-83.
Матвеенко В. Д., Королев А. В., Бахтин М. А.

This paper studies a model of game interaction with externalities on a network, in which agents choose their level of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that in both cases agents may be passive, active and hyperactive, and conditions for optimality of these types of behavior are derived. In particular, we study the case of a full homogeneous network and show that an increase in its size facilitates active state of agents but reduces their utility.