Индекс восприятия коррупции и связанные с ним характеристики
In this study, for the first time in Russian practice from a large amount of empirical data on state contracts for procurement of goods, works and services, made a major budgetary organization during 2008-2010., Examines factors affecting the decline in trading, delays in supplies, as well as problems in the performance of obligations under the contracts. The analysis showed that a reduction prices at the auctions directly dependent on the number of applications accepted for review by the competitive commissions. Falling prices are more frequent in the procurement of goods and experimental trust (compared to the benefits of the inspection), as well as a state contract for works. However, the prices are much less likely to have been lowered in auctions (compared to purchasing through quotations and tenders). Delays in supplies occurred in 27% of patients and were more frequent in the procurement of experimental benefits, and were characterized for major purchases and state contracts executed during the I-III quarters of the year. More serious problems in the performance of obligations, full fraught with supply disruptions, have characterized the state contracts, culminating in the IV quarter. The overall risk supply disruptions were reported only 5% of purchases at competitive procedures, but on the contracts accounted for nearly half of all purchases of the budget organization in 2008-2010. Based on the analysis in the formulation of recommendations to improve the system of public procurement.
This paper presents an analysis of corruption in Russia and its interrelations with the country’s economic and political regime - primarily in the post-soviet period.
The chapter of the book systematically examine various effects of resource curse in such arenas as rule of law and property rights in Russia in comparison with the other oil-and-gas exporting countries beginning from the XXI century.
The author offers an analysis of the Russian market theses services.
The idea of ligalization of bribe giving for certain types of bribes was expressed by K. Basu in 2011 and got a name Basu proposal. In this paper we discuss effects that can be caused by the direct implementation of this proposal. Our game-theoretic model shows that while legalisation of certain bribe-giving occurances can lead to some positive consequences, it is not always a good idea to return bribe to the bribe-giver as suggested by Basu. The chance to get the paid bribe back increases the amount of bribes that end up in corrupt officials' pockets.
The publication includes articles related to International scientific and practical conference dedicated to the interaction of the ruling elite and the systemic opposition in modern Russia and abroad, which was held in the Volga Institute of Management named after PA Stolypin (Saratov), 5-6 September 2012