Война как массовый протест
This third edition of Moral Constraints on War offers a principle by principle presentation of the ethics of war as is found in the age-old tradition of the Just War. Parts one and two trace the evolution of Just War Theory, analyzing the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello: the principles that determine the conditions under which it is just to start a war and then conduct military operations. Each chapter provides a historical background of the principle under discussion and an in-depth analysis of its meaning. More so than in the previous editions, there is a special focus on the transcultural nature of the principles. Besides theoretical clarifications, each of the principles is also put to the test with numerous historical and contemporary examples. In Part three, Just War Theory is applied in three specific case studies: the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in World War II, the Korean War (1950-53), and the use of armed drones in the "war on terror." Bringing together an international coterie of philosophers and political scientists, this accessible and practical guide offers both students of military ethics and of international relations rich, up-to-date insights into the pluralistic character of Just War Theory.
The article considers punishment as a source of legitimization of war. The author traces the history of punitive paradigm of war, notes the moment when it was replaced by the legalist paradigm and considers the reactualization of the idea of punishment as a just basis of war. In order to to deal with these issues, the author considers the formation of the punitive doctrine of war in the writings of Christian authors of 3-4 centuries. He analyzes the logic of justifying the war that appeared in the thoughts of Ambrose of Milan and Augustine Aurelius. Both theologians indicated the necessity to punish sin as a key cause of war. Next, the process of secularization of the doctrine of just war in Modern times is considered. During this period, the legalist paradigm of war had been developed. The right of states to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity became most relevant just cause of war. Then, the author notes appeal to the idea of protection of human rights as a basis for justifying war, typical for the modern just war theory. Also, the revival of interest to the idea of punishment is considered and the possible reasons for the reactualization of the punitive paradigm in the turn of the 20-21 centuries are examined.
Most books and articles still treat leadership and ethics as related though separate phenomena. This edited volume is an exception to that rule, and explicitly treats leadership and ethics as a single domain. Clearly, ethics is an aspect of leadership, and not a distinct approach that exists alongside other approaches to leadership. This holds especially true for the for the military, as it is one of the few organizations that can legitimately use violence. Military leaders have to deal with personnel who have either used or experienced violence. This intertwinement of leadership and violence separates military leadership from leadership in other professions. Even in a time that leadership is increasingly questioned, it is still good leadership that keeps soldiers from crossing the thin line between legitimate force and excessive violence
The article considers the role that the images of the saints play in the discourses of war and violence in contemporary Russian Orthodoxy, primarily among Orthodox nationalists, parish subculture and movements of 2012–2018. Taking Mark Juergensmeyer’s concept of “cosmic war”, the authors examine the images of the saints as the personifications of the sacred that express certain meanings in the context of the symbolic struggle between good and evil. The saints establish the sacred cosmos, protect it, purify it, and sacrifice themselves for its sake, and their examples is used both in constructing the narrative and performing of the militant-minded believers. In the article, the images of the saints are classified into four categories: warrior-rulers, purifying rulers, protectors of faith, and soldiers martyrs. Particular attention is paid to the role of saints in legitimizing real wars, public conflicts and rallies against the demonstration of “blasphemous” films, exhibitions and performances. The authors conclude that these personifications constitute an autonomous source of authority that makes “militancy” the feature of the tradition, and that the image of a particular saint is highly variable, being able to legitimize violence to a greater or lesser extent depending on the character of a group.
The ongoing current transformation of war is different from the transformations of the past not only in scope, but also in its meaning and profoundness. This transformation is comparable only to the profound transformation, which was taking place at the dawn of Modernity and led to the emergence of the sovereign states. The contemporary transformation is triggered by the tectonic shift in the forms of political sovereignty, the emergence of the global sovereign authority. The most important change, related to this transformation is the change in the moral content and meaning of war. The author of this article provides ethical description and evaluation of this change. This goal is accomplished through the normative characteristic of motives, means, goals and meanings of war. The ethical analysis of the major characteristics of war makes it possible to claim that the ongoing moral degradation of war is taking place. This degradation derives not only from the predominantly unreasonable motives of the contemporary war, the lack of proper honor and courage, but also from the very impossibility of victory in the proper sense of the term in the new war. War becomes absolute and permanent. We need some new conceptual tools to grasp the new moral reality of war, since the dominant just war theory is hardly of any use in this regard.
The social and political meaning of war has changed over the history of Western civilization. Each era from Antiquity to the present has its own way of understanding war and providing it with moral assessment. At the same time, the duality of the attitude to war was steadily reproduced. People were constantly trying to tame violence, and cursing war, they were time after time looking for the excuse to keep fighting. We will try to understand why that happened answering a number of questions: What is war? How has reflection on the meaning of war changed over time? What benefit did belligerents get out of war? Can war be just and unjust? What was treated as permissible and intolerable on the battlefield? How the attitude towards war has changed since the beginning of the 21 century?
The principle of Last Resort belongs to the core principles of Just War Theory. It is regarded as one of the contstraints on war. In its application the combatants are concerned with taking all possible efforts not to be provoced to start a war before it is truly necessary or unavoidable. In this chapter we not only look throuhg the theoretical aspects, but also consider a number of practical cases.
The principle of Right Intentions is closely related to the Just Cause Principle. It may be referred to as the subjective part of the Right Intentions. Nevertheless it is regarded as a moral principle in its own right. Further mor the intention to go to war may have nothing to do with the Just Cause, even if it does exist. In this chapter we also consider a number of practical cases.
In what follows I make two interrelated claims: 1. It is necessary to understand terrorism as a communicative action, not as a negative label. There are thus 5 major types of terror actions (Affective, Traditional, Value-Rational, Rational and Hyper Rational), which have little in common. The term ‘terrorism’ itself is an empty abstraction and it is impossible to ‘fight terror’. 2. Terrorism may be and often is much more morally constrained than ‘warrism’. Terroristic struggle is, at least in theory, morally superior to war. Two case studies (Russian terrorism and Chechen terrorism) are provided as empirical justification of the claims.