О некоторых проблемах доверия статистике
Based on the analysis of actual problems of legal statistics suggestions for improving its use in the study of crime and measures of the struggles she and demonstrates ways to increase trust legal statistics and teaching effectiveness as discipline in law schools.
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia) in the creation of antitrust system was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice. The analysis takes into account such institutional problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions (“per se” vs “rule of reason”), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities, especially in criminal investigation issues etc.
The article shows how the integration within the EU predetermined the development of antitrust policy in CEE countries, including the trend of the use of "rule of reason" approach. Simultaneously in the article was analyzed the experience of CEE countries in the variability of government intervention mechanisms.
In the third part of the article were shown main trends in antitrust policy transformation in CEE and common problems, that still remain actual for transition economies in this area, including the interaction problem of administrative and criminal law, rigidity of prohibitions problem and the effectiveness of leniency program design.
The underinvestment in the specific assets due to the «hold up» is one of the key issues in the theory of the firm. Till the very end of the twentieth century discussing the «hold up» problem researchers considered only the so-called «selfish» relation-specific investments. But later their attention was switched to the analysis of another specific investments type, named «cooperative» or «cross» investments, which is much more risky than the selfish investments. Besides that, the riskiness of such investments depends on their specifity degree – the specific investments can be partly specific or full specific. In its turn, the degree of specifity determined by the partners’ ability to benefit from selfish or cooperative specific investments in contacts with “alternative” contractors. If such gains equal zero, that specific investments (cooperative or selfish) are full specific to the “main” partner. Respectively, if the gains from partnership with “alternative” contractors are more than zero, that such specific investments are partly specific to the “main” partner.
Unfortunately the present regulatory documents, determining the application the rule of reason, don’t take into account the character of specific investments. The negative consequences of such approach are illustrated in the first part of the article, where the court’s decision in case of Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS (PFDC) v. Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence, Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi is analyzed. The second part of the article is dedicated to the discussion of possible solutions of this problem.
Dr. Frédéric Jenny is the Renaissance man of competition policy. As an economist, scholar, judge and enforcer, he has helped transform the landscape of global competition enforcement. In the first volume of this Liber Amicorum, distinguished members of both Bar and Bench, as well as academics from around the world, come together to bear testimony to his international achievements. This collection of 21 articles celebrates Dr. Jenny’s career thus far, and also explores other timely and topical areas of competition law and policy.