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Effects of Hostility Tradition in Antitrust: Leniency Programs and Cooperation Agreements
Высшая школа экономики
,
2014.
No. 58/EC/2014.
Павлова Н. С., Shastitko A.
The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous effects, including the destruction and prevention of welfare enhancing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results help understand the negative impact the hostility tradition resulting in type I enforcement errors can have on social welfare when applied to the regulation of horizontal agreements.
Makarov A., Современная конкуренция 2014 № 4 (46) С. 3-25
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia) in the creation of antitrust system was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice. The analysis takes into account ...
Added: September 30, 2014
Makarov A., / Высшая школа экономики. Series PA "Public Administration". 2014. No. 20.
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of BRICS, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia) in the creation of antitrust institutions was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice. This ...
Added: December 4, 2014
Yusupova G. F., Spiridonova O. I., Современная конкуренция 2010 № 5(23) С. 84-95
Публикация продолжает серию учебно-методических материалов по курсу «Теория отраслевых рынков». В данной теме представлены материалы, посвященные анализу факторов, влияющих на стимулы фирм к сговору, а также задания, освещающие проблемы антимонопольной политики в отношении сговоров фирм. ...
Added: October 21, 2012
Павлова Н. С., Shastitko A., Вопросы экономики 2014 № 3 С. 62-85
В статье анализируются эффекты, связанные с внедрением программ ослабления наказания за участие в картеле в ситуации, когда антимонопольный орган может совершать ошибки при квалификации соглашений между конкурентами. Согласно выводам исследования, внедрение такой программы может препятствовать росту общественного благосостояния, разрушая и предотвращая полезную кооперацию между фирмами. Полученные результаты позволяют объяснить некоторые особенности антимонопольных дел, расследованных в ...
Added: September 28, 2014
Avdasheva S. B., Shastitko A., Post-Communist Economies 2011 Vol. 23 No. 4 P. 493-505
In recent years the role of anti-monopoly policy in Russia has grown significantly. The enforcement power of the anti-trust agency has increased dramatically. At the same time adverse trends in competition policy have emerged and strengthened. The main reason was, paradoxically, a growing role of anti-trust policy in the Russian government. The enforcement of anti-trust ...
Added: November 3, 2012
Yusupova G. F., Киселева О. Н., Современная конкуренция 2014 № 3 С. 20-35
Antitrust legislation of many countries admits horizontal agreements between market participants as illegal per se not only in case of price fixing, market sharing, but also in case of bid-riggings. This paper has presented a review and an academic assessment of market participants behavior at auctions by bidding. Such behavior creates incentives to collude and ...
Added: August 2, 2014
Golovanova S., Современная конкуренция 2015 Т. 9 № 4(52) С. 65-76
Non-competitive behavior of auction participants is a serious problem, leading to losses of economic efficiency of projects where the mechanism is used. Such violations are quite common in Russia and are traditionally in the focus of attention of antitrust authority. In practice, the prosecution of competition-restricting agreements is often problematic, given the diversity of their ...
Added: December 13, 2015
Avdasheva S. B., Shastitko A., Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle 2011 Т. 8 № 2 С. 1-11
The paper is about Russian practice of introducing a leniency program. In the article authors examine the history of changes to the norms governing the exemption from liability for participating in cartel agreements and the characteristics of competition policy in Russia, which objectively hinder the effectiveness of the program. ...
Added: November 3, 2012
Makarov A., Современная конкуренция 2014 № 2(44) С. 39-59
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the creation of antitrust institutions was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice, in particular, unique features in the use of "rule of reason" approach. Also were ...
Added: May 23, 2014
Авдашева С.Б., Голованова С.В., Крючкова П.В. et al., М. : Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2018
Книга посвящена исследованию непростого соотношения между задачами применения антимонопольных запретов и повышения конкурентоспособности в условиях, когда крупный продавец на одном из этапов цепочки создания стоимости влияет на модель конкуренции на связанных рынках. Спектр исследования широк - от рынка природного газа до рынка обслуживания автомобилей. Проанализированы использованные в регулировании концепции и решения экономической политики в отношении ...
Added: February 1, 2018
Makarov A., Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6: Экономика 2018 № 1 С. 65-81
This article discusses the rapid formation of the Rule of Reason (ROR) approach in antitrust policy in the field of anti – competitive agreements. In many countries (the US, EU) there was a significant reduction of the use of per se approach (prohibition on the base of formal characteristics) in favor of the ROR approach, ...
Added: December 5, 2017
Golovanova S., Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации 2013 № 4(20) С. 110-132
Theoretical background for reasons that cause the owner of essential facilities to restrict competition in downstream markets provided. Examining the particular Russian antitrust cases the author discusses whether the essential facilities doctrine may be helpful to solve the problem. While the doctrine seems to be quite efficient when considering infrastructure industriesits use in other casesis ...
Added: December 9, 2013
Makarov A., Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6: Экономика 2016 № 1 С. 84-107
This article analyzes the antitrust enforcement practice in Russia (2008–2010) in the area of competition restricting agreements (horizontal and vertical). The analysis is based on courts decisions database (litigations with the Russian competition authority - FAS). Database contains 242 cases, including 139 horizontal agreements, 103 vertical and mixed agreements. On the basis of this database we have analyzed important features ...
Added: April 9, 2016
Павлова Н. С., Kurdin A., Поляков Д. А., Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6: Экономика 2021 № 1 С. 103-127
The article is based on the research in mobile applications markets. The distribution of market power in these markets depends on the ability of a digital ecosystem’s owner to control the handling of mobile applications inside the ecosystem. The degree of this control is determined by the substitutability of different application stores as necessary facilities ...
Added: July 2, 2021
Shastitko A., Kurdin A., Моросанова (Комкова) А. А., Вестник Московского университета. Серия 6: Экономика 2016 № 6 С. 39-56
The article analyses the main features of the intellectual activity results market through the lens of the product boundaries definition. Frequently the pirated copy is not considered as a substitute for original products in legal cases. However, unlicensed computer programs should be included in the product market boundaries regardless of its legal status if the ...
Added: August 15, 2017
Shastitko A., Golovanova S., CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2013 No. 2 P. 1-19
This article demonstrates that even established and verified facts of agreements among producers are not sufficient conditions for either cartel identification and, as a consequence, prosecution of agreement participants. Qualifying sellers’ interactions on a market as collusion is not a simple task, although it might seem so if using an oversimplified world vision. To illustrate, ...
Added: December 4, 2013
Shastitko A., Golovanova S., Russian Journal of Economics 2016 No. 2 P. 86-110
This paper presents competition studies and views on competition policy within Austrian economics related to the dynamic capabilities theory. The idea of interacting research programs in economics is used to provide the frame for reflections on particular issues of discussion: competition, on the one hand, and (1) ignorance, (2) knowledge (including tacit knowledge), (3) rationality, ...
Added: May 9, 2016
Shastitko A., Golovanova S., Avdasheva S. B., World Competition: Law and Economics Review 2014 Vol. 37 No. 2 P. 235-248
The article discusses a recent antitrust case brought against Russian manufacturers of large diameter pipes (LDPs) that aimed to investigate supposed collusive practices that contradicted the law ‘On the Protection of Competition’, which prohibits market sharing and restricting production.The Russian competition agency (FAS) confirmed the infringement under Article 11 of the law ‘On the Protection ...
Added: June 5, 2014
Rozanova N. M., США и Канада: экономика, политика, культура 2021 № 6 С. 37-49
The article analyses the latest U.S. research papers in the area of antitrust policy. The key trends and global challenges for U.S. antimonopoly policy in digital economy are provided. Many traditional instruments of competition policy have turned out to be outdated in digital economy. Antitrust regulation needs to be revisited. The U.S. experience that is ...
Added: July 19, 2021
Kurdin A., Мелешкина А. И., Современная конкуренция 2017 Т. 11 № 2 С. 18-35
A critical issue for the implementation of the comparable markets method in antitrust are the criteria for choosing benchmarks. The paper focuses on the criteria for determining benchmark price levels for cases involving abuse of dominance in the form of excessive or predatory pricing. We determine the set of the most important criteria for choosing ...
Added: August 15, 2017
Yusupova G. F., Современная конкуренция 2015 Т. 9 № 54 С. 52-69
Most of collusion participants have incentives to commit to collusion because of their high estimations of future profits. However Leniency Program can affect incentives of collusion participants through the analysis of market structure changes. The analyses of Leniency Program effects on stability and duration of collusions increases the efficiency both the work of the antimonopoly ...
Added: February 9, 2016
Kuzin D. A., Никифоров С. А., Новости маркетинга 2005 № 7 С. 19-24
В данной статье сравниваются две методики, которые могут применяться специалистами в области маркетинга для оценки конкурентного окружения на рынке. ...
Added: December 9, 2012
Svetunkov S., Современная конкуренция 2017 Т. 11 № 6 (66) С. 5-26
The article is devoted to the presentation of the methodological foundations of the theory of multilevel competition and the justification of a set of new methods and coefficients for analyzing the level of competition in individual markets and in the market of multilevel competition as a whole (by the example of a two-level market). The ...
Added: January 26, 2018
Yusupova G. F., / Высшая школа экономики. Series PA "Public Administration". 2013. No. WP BRP 06/PA/2012.
The empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia show the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We show that LP in Russia make enforcement of the ...
Added: November 5, 2013