Интерес и незаинтересованность: проблема антропологического приоритета
Modern consciousness regards homo oeconomicus as a self-evident model of human being, so that it takes considerable efforts from economic anthropology to find the limits of this model. What are the circumstances under which this model has emerged and became effective? How does it happen that the model gets naturalized? Self-interest is one of its essential components: as we know from Foucault homo oeconomicus conquers moral sciences exactly at the same period when the new object of governance, the self-interested man, is born. After Foucault and his followers history of modern economy has turned nowadays into the genealogy of self-interest, the archaeology of science and technology of governing interests.
However, modernity has also produced quite another kind of subject, the disinterested consciousness, which, according to Husserl, suspends “natural life interests” and substitutes them with theoretical interests. Is there any compatibility between these two narratives on interest? Is it true that disinterestedness antedates interest in the phenomenological sense, or both emerge simultaneously? In this paper I undertake phenomenological description of the experience of interestedness and disinterestedness in order to get closer to what can be on the other side of economic interest.