Экономика ОГПУ-НКВД-МВД. 1930 – 1952. Масштабы, структура, тенденции развития
The international sanctions has been affecting Iran’s economy for the last forty years. During this time, their pressure on Iran’s economy was uneven. The most sensitive measures of economic pressure against Tehran was applied in 2010 – 2015. They cut the country from the international banking and insurance system. Tehran’s access to foreign investments, advanced technologies and international sea carriage services was restricted. Its options to sell oil in external markets and import gasoline were also limited. Consequently, the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, so called nuclear deal) signed between Tehran and the international group of negotiators in 2015 was welcomed by the Iranian population and large part of the country’s elite. This document was lifting most of the previously imposed sanctions and gave Iran hopes for less troubled economic development.
Yet, the decision of US president, Donald Trump, voiced in Spring 2018 to leave the JCPOA change the situation around Iran once again. The renewal of US sanction pressure on Tehran caused serious concerns among the international community. The authorities of the EU, Russia and China are rightfully worried that the re-introduction of the US sanctions can create difficulties for doing business with Tehran and provoke the Iranian elite to consider options for Tehran to leave the nuclear deal. According to these concerns, sanctions might have negative impact on the domestic situation in Iran causing the growth of social unrest and strengthening of the position of conservative forces less prepared for the dialogue with the outer world. These concerns got only strengthened when, in November 2018, Trump imposed oil trade embargo on Tehran (with the provision of oil sanctions waiver for only eight countries and limited period of six months). Yet, these pessimistic scenarios should be taken with a grain of salt. Some of the current events and past experience clearly demonstrate that the re-imposed sanctions might become less effective than expected by the US.
This paper puts forth a comprehensive set of measures to address the current economic crisis, prevent its further aggravation and ensure sustained and ongoing development of the Russian economy. In this study we seek to adopt the viewpoint of common sense and keep free from political and ideological bias. This is why we believe the proposed solutions should be implemented by any reasonable government irrespective of its political coloration. This text presents our vision of the Russian economy and its problems.
In this paper we study convergence among Russian regions. We find that while there was no convergence in 1990s, the situation changed dramatically in 2000s. While interregional GDP per capita gaps still persist, the differentials in incomes and wages decreased substantially. We show that fiscal redistribution did not play a major role in convergence. We therefore try to understand the phenomenon of recent convergence using panel data on the interregional reallocation of capital and labor. We find that capital market in Russian regions is integrated in a sense that local investment does not depend on local savings. We also show that economic growth and financial development has substantially decreased the barriers to labor mobility. We find that in 1990s many poor Russian regions were in a poverty trap: potential workers wanted to leave those regions but could not afford to finance the move. In 2000s (especially in late 2000s), these barriers were no longer binding. Overall economic development allowed even poorest Russian regions to grow out of the poverty traps. This resulted in convergence in Russian labor market; the interregional gaps in incomes, wages and unemployment rates are now below those in Europe. The results imply that economic growth and development of financial and real estate markets eventually result in interregional convergence.
In this paper we introduce a model of a society with two distinct linguistic groups, each consisting of heterogeneous individuals speaking their native language. There is also a world language so that every individual is faced with four learning choices: to study the other local language only, to study the world language only, to study both, and to refrain from studying either language. We examine the Nash equilibiria of that game determined by communicative benefits (Selten & Pool), and address inefficiency of the equilibrium. We then show that government subsidies for language learning could serve as welfare‐enhancing policies. Finally, we analyze the three‐language policy, certain variants of which have been adopted in multilingual countries or regions.