In the chapter the main philosophical ideas of the American pragmatists - Ch.S. Peirce, W. James, J. Dewey - are exposed.
is paper is concerned with Heidegger’s esoteric notion of philosophy developed during his Rektorat-period (1933–1934) in accordance with the Platonic model of community described in the Politeia. e principal hypothesis is that Heidegger’s notion of philosophy as the knowledge of the truth and as a specific educational program was conceived as an exclusive and elitist one; it allows Heidegger to distance himself from the public sphere and criticize any form of public discourse as resulting from the improper mode of being. In this paper the first part of the lecture "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1933–34) is discussed where Heidegger interprets Plato’s allegory of the cave and presents the “German revolution” as a unique event which provides an opportunity to integrate decisively politics with philosophy. e paper also explores Hannah Arendt’s arguments against the esoteric notion of philosophy and politics in her essay "Philosophy and politics" (1990).
F. Werfel about G. Verdi (based on the composition «Verdi. Novel of the opera») (by Zusman V. G., Zusman N. D.). In this paper the cultural opposition «Verdi - Wagner» is discussed. The opposition is described by the Austrian writer Franz Werfel in his «Verdi. Novel of the opera». Werfel compares the artistic world and the personality of the Italian composer Giuseppe Verdi with the German composer Richard Wagner. The author comes to conclusion, that the principle of melody, the power of an individual human voice expressed in the music of Verdi are much more important than the combined force of the instruments in the orchestra of Wagner.
While the traditional philosophical epistemology stresses the importance of distinguishing knowledge from true beliefs, the formalisation of this distinction with standard logical means turns out to be problematic. In Knowledge Representation (KR) as a Computer Science discipline this crucial distinction is largely neglected. A practical consequence of this neglect is that the existing KR systems store and communicate knowledge that cannot be verified and justified by users of these systems without external means. Information obtained from such systems does not qualify as knowledge in the sense of philosophical epistemology.
Recent advances in the research area at the crossroad of the computational mathematical logic, formal epistemology and computer science open new perspectives for an effective computational realisation of justificatory procedures in KR. After exposing the problem of justification in logic, epistemology and KR, we sketch a novel framework for representing knowledge along with relevant justificatory procedures, which is based on the Homotopy Type theory (HoTT). This formal framework supports representation of both propositional knowledge, aka knowledge-that, and non-propositional knowledge, aka knowledge-how or procedural knowledge. The default proof-theoretic semantics of HoTT allows for combining the two sorts of represented knowledge at the formal level by interpreting all permissible constructions as justification terms (witnesses) of associated propositions.
The essay on thinking of thinking. The article is motivated by the 80-th birth anniversary of outstanding psychologist and pedagogue V.V. Davydov who was engaged, in collaboration with D.B. Elkonin, in elaboration of psychological foundations and pedagogical practices of developing education. The program he has devised focused on the advance of schoolchildren’s capacity for theoretical thinking and formation of readiness, inclination and capacity for conceptual thinking. An attempt to apply V.V. Davydov’s ideas to analysis of the thinking per se is made. Special attention is given to reflexion and intuition.
En révélant l’influence de l’interprétation de Koyré dans les lectures que fait Henry de la philosophie boehmienne, je propose d’interroger la position henryenne qui, en s’appuyant sur les concepts classiques de l’originaire et de l’authentique, refuse au monde – et par là à toute connaissance théorique – le statut de vérité. Je me demande donc s’il est suffisant d’exclure chaque tentative d’expression de la manifestation de l’Absolu. Peut-être faut-il relire le projet de la phénoménologie comme une science descriptive plutôt que prescriptive ?