Book chapter
Два модуса негативности: онтологический статус отрицания в двумерной семантике
This paper examines ontological strategies of Western existential philosophy (its "atheistic" current) and the Buddhist philosophical school (darsana) of madhyamaka. We can discover similar phenomenological strategies together with extreme differences in anthropology and the value purposes (personalism and deconstruction of classical European subject in the existential philosophy and radical impersonalism of Buddhism). We suppose that Heidegger, Sartre and Buddhism have comparable theories of consciousness. The madhyamaka's "sunyata" (emptiness) is comparable with Heidegger's and Sartre's "Nothingness" (though they are not absolutely similar) and we can discover primacy of negativity in both cases. We also try to substantiate that the position of madhyamaka (that created a fundamental ontology) was a radical nihilism and not scepticism contrary to the position of a number of modern buddologists. And what is also important for us is the problem of the "unhappy consciousness" (be it Buddhist "duhkha" or "Sorge" of Heidegger, or Sartre's "Nausea") and different attitudes of thinkers towards it.
The topic of the present research is to demonstrate the key transformations of the intellectual practice related to the development of such category as negativity (non-existence) in the modern philosophy. Historically, classical philosophical solution to the problem of negative was to place it in the domain of transcendential, i.e. to substitute it with God, noumenality, will, etc. However, the conclusion of the post-Hegelian reflections is that the negative should be reunited with the world through man, who ultimately represents a part of this world. This inclusion of negative into the structure of Being, i.e. basically the ontologization of non-being, allows for integration of praxis into the world. Human dimension in this case is no longer a side effect, a consequence of a primary autonomy of the world, but represents that form through which the world comes to existence. This strategy of thematization of negative as the bases for transition from fundamental ontology to fundamental anthropology becomes the key theme for a number of philosophical contexts of the 20th century (Kojève, Sartre, Heidegger). At the same time, this strategy might be countered by another alternative, when negative is understood in such a way as to fully implement its own differential instead of substantial mission. Study of many concepts conceived in the 20th century shows that the main principle of this alternative was grossly disregarded – various excuses were used to subject negative to inadmissible for nonexistent substantivization. Had we reserved the only role for negativity – to manage the movement of distinctions and to distinguish – we could have avoided both – the antinomies found in classical philosophy as well as disappointments accompanying philosophical thought of the modern period.
This paper examines ontological strategies of Western existential philosophy (its “atheistic” current) and the Buddhist school (darśana) of mādhyamaka. We can discover similar phenomenological strategies together with extreme differences in anthropology and the value purposes (personalism and deconstruction of classic European subject in the existential philosophy and radical impersonalism of Buddhism). We suppose that Heidegger, Sartre and Buddhism have comparable theories of consciousness. The mādhyamaka’s “śūnyata” (emptiness) is comparable with Heideggers’s and Sartre’s “Nothingness” (though they are not absolutely similar) and we can discover primacy of negativity in both cases. We also try to substantiate that the position of mādhyamaka was a radical nihilism and not scepticism contrary to the opinion of a number of modern buddologists. And what is also important for us is the problem of the “unhappy consciousness” (be it the Buddhist “duḥkha” or “Sorge”of Heidegger, or Sartre’s “Nausea”) and different attitudes of thinkers towards it.