«Теория казней Божьих»: от Начального свода к Повести временных лет
It is known that Old Rusian chronicles were not only extended, but also inetnsively edited by the newcoming generations of bookmen. Usually the reasons for editing of text are searched amongst the political circumstances of the time. However, changing approaches to actual theological questions could also be the cause of text evolution. One of such was the question of the nature of suffering, on which there existed at least two views — the one of the author of so-called Načalnyj Svod of the 1090ies, and the outher of the author of Pověst Vremennykh Lět.
This contribution to a volume on the“ultimate why-question” discusses ambiguities in Leibniz’s formulation of the question, “[. . . ] pourquoi il y a plus tôt quelque chose que rien”. This formulation poses two problems: Leibniz does not explain how to understand the concepts of “something” and “nothing”. And it is not clear, whether “something” and “nothing” are contradictory opposites, so that there is either nothing or something, or whether both concepts denote principles which are effective in the world at the same time. My analysis rests on the hypothesis that the relevant context for Leibniz’s question is the theology of creation.
Hence, the paper compares eight different approaches to “creation from nothing” (Thomists, Scotists, Taurellus, Lubinus, Timpler, Keckermann, Kircher, Knorr von Rosenroth, van Helmont). Candidates for the nihil the world was created from include absolute non-being, thoughts in God’s mind, unformed matter, imaginary space, or a self-contraction of the Divine spirit. These different approaches can be translated into different versions of the “ultimate why-question”. The paper concludes that Leibniz’s formulation contains a comparison between two Divine acts of creation, because not only “something”, but “nothing” as well owes its subsistence to the Divine will. This rises substantial questions: either God created first an imperfect entity in order to create the world as a whole, or Leibniz subscribes to an emanative understanding of creation that either levels the difference between creation and (natural) generation or is based on misunderstanding God as a material entity.
The article is devoted to the study of the theological article as a representative of theoretical theological discourse. In the article, the determinants of this kind of discourse are singled out, determinants viewed as its key features enhancing the argumentative effect.
This note discusses one of the largely super uous conjectures unearthed by J. Diggle and given an honourable place in his otherwise very succinct and e cient apparatus criticus. Reported by none of the recent editors, and earlier by Prinz–Wecklein and Verrall, Herwerden’s μελανόσπλαγχνος in Euripides’ Medea 109 is an undesirable change of the sound, if idiosyncratic, mss. reading μεγαλόσπλαγχνος. Diggle, however, having (independently) conjectured the same word, patched together arguments for it. An additional attraction this conjecture gained in his eyes was due to his misreading of the remark (quoted in the heading) Wilamowitz made proofreading the rst volume of Murray’s OCT in 1901. While Wilamowitz discouraged Murray from reporting this conjecture with his usual “besser fort”, Diggle, on passing acquaintance with the letters, took it to mean “Herw. besser fort[asse]”, thus corroborating his point.
The book is a publication of a full text of M.Kh. Aleshkovskiy’s candidate of sciences (PhD) thesis defended in 1967 and previously available only in a shortened popular edition.
Papers of XXVII Annual theological conference of St. Tikhon's University