Чем в «Трактате» не является «Этика»
The paper claims all metaphysical views could be divided in two classes: metaphysical moral exclusivism that is the idea of the otherworldly nature of morality, and metaphysical moral inclusivism that is the idea that morality is an intrinsic component of the reality. The originality of the proposed separation is justiﬁ ed by historical review and the comparison with known ethical concepts. We also consider how the metaphysical notions of morality should correlate with the methodology of the empirical study of moral consciousness. We show that asking the question about the place of morality in the structure of reality imposes some theoretical constraints upon the Is-Ought Problem.
In this early paper C. Wright Mills tries to ground the possibility for the study of thinking (including logical) from the perspective of sociology of knowledge. Following G.H. Mead, he shows that thinking is a social process because every thinker converses with his or her audience using the norms of rationality and logicality common to his or her culture. Language serves as a mediator between thinking and social patterns. Proposing to consider the meaning of language as the common social behavior evoked by it, Mills finds a way to combine three levels of analysis: psychological, social and cultural.
The questions considered in this review of the recently published book "There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science" by Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read, and Wes Sharrock, pertain to the philosophy of the methodology of social sciences: what research problems can sociology study? is it possible for sociology to study social world as an empirical world, and what consequences will this sociologists' empirical attitude toward their subject have? The review explores how the authors of the book, with the help of Peter Winch's philosophy of the social sciences, criticize the project of sociology as an empirical enterprise. Then their own project of sociology is critically examined.
The present catalogue contains abstracts for some 150 volumes, among which books, periodicals, miscellanies, published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the principal institute in Russia for academic research in all kinds of philosophical knowledge. These works, written by eminent Russian scholars, cover such fi elds as the history of Russian, Western and Oriental philosophy, ethics and aesthetics, synergetics and epistemology, social and political philosophy and concentrate on problems that have attained particular importance in the age of globalization and growth of national self-consciousness.
The present volume is devoted to the 'Open Rusian-Finish Colloquium on Logic' (ORFIC), held at the Saint-Petersburg State University, on June 14-16, 2012. Among the participants there were such prominent Finish logicians as Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto ang Gabriel Sandu. The volume covers the most interesting results recently obtained in different areas of research in logic.
This volume is of interest to everyone, concerned in modern logic.
It turns out, however, that in spite of one basic difference there runs between these two systems a deep and striking parallelism. This parallelism is so close indeed that it makes possible the construction of a vocabulary which would transform characteristic propositions of Wittgenstein's ontology into Aristotelian ones, and conversely. To show in some detail the workings of that transformation will be the subject of this paper.