Социальность как негативность
This article discusses how according to Aristotle one can understand the principles of non-being and non-existing and accordingly the possible ways of expressing it.
The topic of the present research is to demonstrate the key transformations of the intellectual practice related to the development of such category as negativity (non-existence) in the modern philosophy. Historically, classical philosophical solution to the problem of negative was to place it in the domain of transcendential, i.e. to substitute it with God, noumenality, will, etc. However, the conclusion of the post-Hegelian reflections is that the negative should be reunited with the world through man, who ultimately represents a part of this world. This inclusion of negative into the structure of Being, i.e. basically the ontologization of non-being, allows for integration of praxis into the world. Human dimension in this case is no longer a side effect, a consequence of a primary autonomy of the world, but represents that form through which the world comes to existence. This strategy of thematization of negative as the bases for transition from fundamental ontology to fundamental anthropology becomes the key theme for a number of philosophical contexts of the 20th century (Kojève, Sartre, Heidegger). At the same time, this strategy might be countered by another alternative, when negative is understood in such a way as to fully implement its own differential instead of substantial mission. Study of many concepts conceived in the 20th century shows that the main principle of this alternative was grossly disregarded – various excuses were used to subject negative to inadmissible for nonexistent substantivization. Had we reserved the only role for negativity – to manage the movement of distinctions and to distinguish – we could have avoided both – the antinomies found in classical philosophy as well as disappointments accompanying philosophical thought of the modern period.
The article examines various theories of punishment, their relationship and criticism. Punishment is an object of study for different disciplines. Interdisciplinary barriers should be overcome. In this article we are to formulate the main principles of convergence of jurisprudence and sociology in the study of punishment.
Few thinkers have addressed the political horrors and ethical complexities of the twentieth century with the insight and passionate intellectual integrity of Hannah Arendt. She was irresistible drawn to the activity of understanding, in an effort to endow historic, political, and cultural events with meaning. Essays in Understanding assembles many of Arendt’s writings from the 1930s, 1940s, and into the 1950s. Included here are illuminating discussions of St. Augustine, existentialism, Kafka, and Kierkegaard: relatively early examinations of Nazism, responsibility and guilt, and the place of religion in the modern world: and her later investigations into the nature of totalitarianism that Arendt set down after The Origins of Totalitarianism was published in 1951. The body of work gathered in this volume gives us a remarkable portrait of Arendt’s developments as a thinker—and confirms why her ideas and judgments remain as provocative and seminal today as they were when she first set them down.
The processes of the growing societal complexity, emergence of new forms of social and political inequality, formation of pre-state or complex stateless polities belong to the most intriguing subjects of Anthropology and Social Philosophy.
Social Evolution & History has consistently published the research articles devoted to these issues. The chiefdom concept plays a special role within the theories that try to account for the transition from simple social systems to systems of greater complexity. Following its emergence in the 1950s this notion became an important heuristic means to advance Anthropology and Archaeology. It was also subjected to vigorous debates within which the participants denied the methodological significance of chiefdoms and the very notion of the chiefdom. These debates are becoming even more vigorous in connection with the rapid accumulation of information on ancient societies (see the dispute over chiefdoms between Timothy Pauketat and Robert Carneiro in 9.1). There is also much discrepancy in the definition of ‘chiefdom’ as some scholars consider it a standard phase of cultural evolution, a natural transition between the ‘Big Man’ society and the states of the ancient world.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.