The article provides a close reading of passages from an early modern dissertation on the concept of nothing by Rudolph Goclenius and Cornelius Götz, defended in 1608 at the University of Marburg. The dissertation is interesting for two reasons. It provides an insight into how early modern school philosophers thought about the role of the concept of nothing across philosophical disciplines (metaphysics, natural philosophy, ethics). And it allows us to understand more fully strategies of citation in this period. The paper demonstrates not only that the concept of nothing was relevant for an analysis of creation or a more precise understanding of non-virtuous action. It also shows that citations could be used to resolve a seeming contradiction, to simplify a complex argument, or to argue against an opponent of one's own view. These practices are quite different from contemporary standards of scholarly practice - a difference that should be kept in mind when trying to unlock the philosophical content of texts from this genre.
This paper examines ontological strategies of Western existential philosophy (its “atheistic” current) and the Buddhist school (darśana) of mādhyamaka. We can discover similar phenomenological strategies together with extreme differences in anthropology and the value purposes (personalism and deconstruction of classic European subject in the existential philosophy and radical impersonalism of Buddhism). We suppose that Heidegger, Sartre and Buddhism have comparable theories of consciousness. The mādhyamaka’s “śūnyata” (emptiness) is comparable with Heideggers’s and Sartre’s “Nothingness” (though they are not absolutely similar) and we can discover primacy of negativity in both cases. We also try to substantiate that the position of mādhyamaka was a radical nihilism and not scepticism contrary to the opinion of a number of modern buddologists. And what is also important for us is the problem of the “unhappy consciousness” (be it the Buddhist “duḥkha” or “Sorge”of Heidegger, or Sartre’s “Nausea”) and different attitudes of thinkers towards it.
This article discusses how according to Aristotle one can understand the principles of non-being and non-existing and accordingly the possible ways of expressing it.
This paper examines ontological and phenimenological strategies of Buddhism in general and the Buddhist school (darśana) of mādhyamaka. The mādhyamaka’s “śūnyata” (emptiness), for example, is comparable with “Nothingness” in Western existential tradition (though they are not absolutely similar) and we can discover primacy of negativity in both cases. We also try to substantiate that the position of mādhyamaka was a radical nihilism and not scepticism contrary to the opinion of a number of modern buddologists. And what is also important for us is the problem of the “unhappy consciousness” (the Buddhist “duḥkha”) and different attitudes of thinkers towards it.
The topic of the present research is to demonstrate the key transformations of the intellectual practice related to the development of such category as negativity (non-existence) in the modern philosophy. Historically, classical philosophical solution to the problem of negative was to place it in the domain of transcendential, i.e. to substitute it with God, noumenality, will, etc. However, the conclusion of the post-Hegelian reflections is that the negative should be reunited with the world through man, who ultimately represents a part of this world. This inclusion of negative into the structure of Being, i.e. basically the ontologization of non-being, allows for integration of praxis into the world. Human dimension in this case is no longer a side effect, a consequence of a primary autonomy of the world, but represents that form through which the world comes to existence. This strategy of thematization of negative as the bases for transition from fundamental ontology to fundamental anthropology becomes the key theme for a number of philosophical contexts of the 20th century (Kojève, Sartre, Heidegger). At the same time, this strategy might be countered by another alternative, when negative is understood in such a way as to fully implement its own differential instead of substantial mission. Study of many concepts conceived in the 20th century shows that the main principle of this alternative was grossly disregarded – various excuses were used to subject negative to inadmissible for nonexistent substantivization. Had we reserved the only role for negativity – to manage the movement of distinctions and to distinguish – we could have avoided both – the antinomies found in classical philosophy as well as disappointments accompanying philosophical thought of the modern period.
The deep split between analytical and continental philosophy of consciousness is now observed. One can reproach the continental philosophy with rare discussions of philosophical problems of physics and neuroscience. The analytical philosophy in turn actually stopped on Kant and Aristotelean logic since Schelling and Hegel created more difficult dialectic logic. The consciousness is unnecessary for this reason in analytical tradition that leads to many paradoxes in thought experiments relate to philosophical zombie (Chalmers, hard problem of consciousness) and the Chinese room (Searle). The article is purposed to show what even quantum ontologies (last hope for many analytical philosophers) can't solve the hard problem of consciousness. Only Sartre, Berdyaev and Heidegger's existential ontologies which are inherited dialectic logic of the German philosophy can try to approach to a solution of the problem of consciousness.
This article analyzes the basic models of "Negative Education" (pedagogical, heuristic and erotic) developed in the XVIII century on the border of philosophy, pedagogy and literature. "Don’t let arisen vice" - the main thesis of Rousseau’s doctrine, which is enough to follow for a successful education and the formation of a virtuous citizen. However, the theory of Rousseau does not exhaust the variety of interpretations of the goals and objectives of the isolation of the child in theories of "Negative Education". Examples of pedagogical novels discussed in this article give an idea of the diversity of these pedagogical experiments in the French social thought in the Enlightenment.