?
Логика эффектов фрейминга Ф. Берто и А. Озгюн – новый формализм для решения проблем семантики пропозициональных установок
The article is devoted to the problems of formalizing the content of propositional attitudes and how successfully these problems can be solved in possible worlds semantics. The focus of attention is, firstly, on the phenomena that in the psychological literature are called framing effects, and in the semantic literature – substitution violation in indirect contexts; and second, the problem of logical omniscience. The first part of the article explains why framing effects create a problem for possible worlds semantics and why the agent is inevitably modeled as logically omniscient in this semantics. Next, a description is given of four approaches to the problem of framing effects in possible worlds semantics: metasemantic, pragmatic, multi-model, and the approach associated with modeling topics. For each of the first three, their main shortcomings are given in relation to this problem and in general. The results of applying the latter approach are considered in more detail in the next part of the article using the example of one of the modern systems of doxastic logic, namely the logic of framing effects by F. Berto and A. Özgün. The syntax and semantic rules of this logic are outlined, after which it is explained how, according to these rules, the description of framing effects should look like. Models of situations are given in which an agent has both a belief in some proposition and a lack of belief in another proposition, which is necessarily equivalent to the first one. It is shown that the modeling method used does not lead to problems and is intuitively adequate. In the last part, the axiomatics of the logic of framing effects are presented and some theorems are given that are significant in the context of the problem of logical omniscience. An interpretation of these theorems is given, on the basis of which it is concluded that this logic does not cope with the problem of logical omniscience as successfully as with the framing effects themselves. In conclusion, a direction is proposed in which the logic of framing effects can be developed in order to more fully solve the problem of logical omniscience, and the prospects for such development are discussed.