The paper provides an analysis of the main approaches to the interpretation of volitional actions in analytical legal philosophy, in the context of legal responsibility and discussions about free will. The most famous examples of the possibility of applying the neuroscience arguments in legal philosophy, in particular when assessing the effect of a volitional act performed consciously on human behavior, are considered. The paper argues that the philosophical argumentation in Gilbert Ryle's logical behaviorism can be used as a rational approach to refute neuroscience data and interpret actions correctly, in terms of legal language. In legal philosophy, the question of the applicability of legal responsibility for an offense committed by a subject is of fundamental importance. On the one hand, a state's use of coercion is aimed to support the regime of legitimacy and encourage lawful actions. However, the justifiability and adequacy of the sanctions and punishments applicable to the subjects of the offenses remain the topic of philosophical and legal discussions. To what extent may discoveries in neuroscience affect a final conclusion supported by arguments? Is there a real need to re-evaluate the degree of "freedom" of an individual in making a rational moral and legally significant choice of behavior? In the theory of legal responsibility, there are two traditional approaches to explaining the meaning of applying punishment to a person who has committed a crime or an offense. The first approach was called consequentialism, as its name suggests, the use of punishment for an offense results in the beneficial social consequences. When punishing the consequences, state intentions are aimed at preventing the illegal actions in the future and to facilitate the rehabilitation effect, which eliminates the consequences of the offense committed. The second approach , known as retributivism, is based on the need for adequate sanctions for the criminal act committed. The offender deserves a punishment, and its application sends a clear signal to society that punishment is inevitable, and it is a basic principle of the legal system.
The paper presents an analysis of the discussion about naturalization of epistemology in the analytic legal philosophy
Lawyers work with statements about verisimilitude of factual statements, while trustworthiness of these statements is evaluated against the backdrop of coherence of factual descriptions. A correct conclusion in law means a consistent reconstruction of normative meanings in the way that fits best the normative system and that allows to cogently subsume factual states of affairs under the established normative meanings.
There are two phenomenological paradigms in space analysis: body-oriented paradigm (Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) and world-oriented one (Martin Heidegger). In this article we will consider key features of the body-oriented paradigm, shortly examining its relationships with the world-oriented one. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty refuse to understand space metaphysically, i.e. as an abstract object uprooted from the life world and acting subject. Their post-metaphysical understanding of space begins with the analysis of constitutive role of human body as a "zero point" setting system of coordinates for human orientation in the world. This creative aspect of human body (incarnated consciousness) reveals within the analysis of spatial thing perception (E.Husserl) and intersubjective dimension of body experience (M. Merleau-Ponty).
The article “God as a Theoretical Object, or About Ontological Status of God Again” consist of introduction, four general parts, and conclusion. In introduction author tells about t way of investigation, which comes her to writing the article.
The first part of research “Brief introduction in history of problem” describes a situation in the middle of XXth century. In 60s arises a new strong interest to God’s existence proves since the possible world semantics has been formulated by Saul Kripke in this years. Author mentions researches of Norman Malcolm, Charles Hartshorne, and Alvin Plantinga since they are extremely important for subsequent investigations.
The second part “The level of semantics” author states of previously own researches. The general idea is multilevel possible world semantics where each level contains the only one sort of essences. The essences of the level can exist in weak of strong sensesEvery level has to be arranged to others levels by principle of Coherent Demanding. . The essences of different levels exist in different senses. The one level is especial – its essences exist “really”. So, really exist state of affairs. God is not state of affairs and not the object like tree, hill, or human. God is especially object, the property of arranging the worlds, the law of construction the system of worlds at all.
The third part “The level of Methodology” author tries to connect own semantics idea of God to V.A. Smirnov’s idea of empirical and theoretical objects. As a result, author concludes that God is theoretical object in methodological sense.
In the fourth part “God as office and as theoretical object” author analyses the possibility of conjunction of methodological idea of V.A. Smirnov on the one side, and the semantics idea of P. Tichy on the other. Here is arise some problem which author doesn’t try to solve in these article.
In the conclusion author deals with results of research So, she also ascribe some ways of following investigation.
This article seems to look at the issue of protest and its cultural predisposition. From the point of view of the author, the protest is dependent on the specific cultural area, on its structure. Russian culture, in a certain way, initially hampering rebel, is the best field for updating and application of protest practices.
The aim of this paper is to explore how from an early age a person acquires an intuitive ideas about what are the thought and language, and how they relate to each other. The sum of intuitions of this kind can be called naive semantics, which is often one of the main targets for philosophical criticism. The overall objective of the paper is to show that such criticism is largely underestimates the value of naive semantics for our intellectual development and cognition, and that it usually incorrectly describes the origins of naïve semantics. In particular, the use of mentalistic idioms that characterize naive semantics is not a secondary and parasitic functioning of language, but a necessary and preliminary step in mastering of abstract, including scientific, concepts.
Some notions of the evolutionary ontological holism in ontological, cognitive and methodological aspects are discussed in the article. It is shown that holism becomes a new fundamental scientific paradigm that determines research strategies, while we return to the integrity of the knowledge, of life and activity orientations existed since ancient times. The ideas of holism become guidelines for creative minds that are flagships of social progress and determine the future of civilization.
The analysis of the methodological and analytical experience of conducting the mixed methods research of deaf and hard of hearing people is considered in this article. Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities makes sociological study of people with various forms of disability especially relevant. At the same time, people with disabilities in most studies are analised as a homogeneous group which does not require differentiation of methods of their study. The lack of attention to people with hearing impairments, as an objects of various studies, usually leads to the use of research design, which ignores the cultural and linguistic features of this community. R.Winiarczyk and E.Wilson note that understanding of complex phenomena such as "culture of the deaf" can not be achieved by using only one research method. They suggest combining in-depth interviews, focus groups, surveys, observations and analysis of natural Documents within one study in order to obtain an valid result. In the described study was used the consecutive mixed methods design, in which the first qualitative stage allowed the full understanfing of the "Deaf culture" notion and selection of indicators for specific cultural practices of the community of people with hearing impairments. This information was later used during condicting a mass poll of deaf and hard of hearing respondents. The use of such design is optimal when the researcher needs the revealing of certain concepts and instrumental elaboration of concepts related to poorly studied groups. In general, the analysis of the structure of interrelated practices, preferences and motives of cultural consumption, which form the patterns of cultural consumption of the deaf and hard of hearing people, made it possible to identify three key sustainable models: "cultural inclusion," "cultural isolation," and "passive cultural consumption". Interrelation of both stages of the study allows us to conclude that specific cultural practices play a special role for deaf and hard of hearing people. Moreover, cultural institutions perform primarily communicative and social functions.
In this paper, I review and discuss the philosophy of action in Wittgenstein’s later works. Firstly, I discuss Wittgenstein’s criticism of the variety of contemporary theories in the philosophy of action. Secondly, part I propose the development of Wittgenstein’s critical remarks in two general directions 1) naturalistic; 2) transcendental.
The article is devoted to the problem of personal and political responsibility in works of Hannah Arendt, the German-American political theorist. Her main study on this subject, «Eichmann in Jerusalem», is presented as an argument against theory of national interest and its main contributor Carl Schmitt.
The aim of this article is to display the constitutive features of analytic philosophy of depiction (APD), a research field barely represented in Russian scientific literature. While sharing some core methodological implications and stylistic patterns with other subdivisions of analytic philosophy, APD tends to form rather enclosed philosophical community with its distinctive theoretical “canon” and highly specialized set of research questions. Philosophers of depiction explore the concept of picture rather than more conventional and broadly understood ‘image’. From this perspective pictures are defined as two-dimensional objects simultaneously possessing some material vehicle (plane, surface) and some visual representational content. Philosophical understanding of pictures usually presupposes reflecting on problems of how pictorial representation works and in which respect it differs from other representational systems, of how ontological duality of depiction may be explained and of how to discern the conditions and singularities of pictorial experience and basic pictorial understanding. Some of these questions were initially posed by philosophers of art, but APD has already obtained theoretical independence from aesthetics at the current stage of its development. The core APD accounts include illusion theory (E.H. Gombrich), structural theories (N. Goodman, J. Kulvicki), seeing-in and twofoldness theory (R. Wollheim), make-believe theory (K. Walton), recognitional theories (F. Schier, D.M. Lopes) and experienced resemblance theories (J. Hyman, R. Hopkins). It is shown that despite their radical discrepancies, they share core standards of argumentation along with tendency to provide “strong” but concise explanations of depiction-related problems as well as to introduce novel, unorthodox notions in order to make their conceptual apparatuses more specified, fine-grained and nuanced. The most original and somewhat idiosyncratic feature of APD is that it generally avoids preoccupations with historical, political or ideological implications of pictures and social conditions of their production, circulation and reception. Hence any further applications of APD’s theoretical accomplishments have a strong need to be supported by comparisons with other directions of research concerning the pictorial and the visual (such as interdisciplinary image studies, visual studies, iconology etc.).
The article discusses the sentential approach to the analysis of propositional attitudes. As a rule, the main tool for interpretation of another's speech and behavior – attitude of holding-true a sentence - escapes our attention in conversation. The reason for this is largely due to the fact that the requirement for a holistic approach to our beliefs depends on the semantic indeterminacy of translation. Author of the article suggests that widened understanding of semantical anomalies can clarify why sentential structure of propositional attitudes usually escapes our attention.
In the paper, I discuss the question of moral responsibility and dependence of the answer on the existence of collective mind. I argue that collective mind is not a necessary condition for collective moral responsibility. For thesis justification, I take responsibility conditions proposed by Christian List and Philip Pettit. Responsibility conditions are normative significance, judgmental capacity and relevant control. It is shown that not only individuals, but groups as well may satisfy such conditions. The presence of collective mind does not make any difference in satisfying all three conditions together or each one separately. Therefore, the possibility of collective responsibility for groups does not depend on the presence of collective mind.