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On the Epistemological-Ontological Transition Made by Illusionism and Realism
The article is about the discussion between realists and illusionists on phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal properties or qualia. The author considers what he calls epistemological-ontological transition made by illusionists and realists – transition from epistemologically significant statements to ontologically significant ones. The option to avoid such transition is tested in order to overcome some obstacles that the transition can bring to the discussion. The paper provides examples of the transition made by both camps and some pros and contras in terms of rejection of epistemological-ontological transition. The author comes to the conclusion that there are meaningful arguments for both options. On one hand, we can reject making the transition to ontology in terms of present discussion. First, it places puzzlement for the opponents and slows the discussion. Second, the very reason for the transition is poorly justified. Third, the core of the discussion – or at least its argumentative part – between illusionists and realists is rather epistemological and moving to ontology blurs the key points the argue is about. On the other hand we can save the transition due to the ontological roots of the discussion and the need in consequences of epistemological statements of the sides. The author then points out that eliminating of epistemological-ontological transition does not assume denying the ontological significance of the present discussion and the problem of the nature of consciousness is definitely worth considering – but probably after the epistemological part of the problem will be carefully considered.