Институциональные и культурные ограничения догоняющих стран
This study identifies how country differences on a key cultural dimension—egalitarianism— influence the direction of different types of international investment flows. A society's cultural orientation toward egalitarianism is manifested by intolerance for abuses of market and political power and a desire for protecting the weak and less powerful actors. We show egalitarianism to be based on exogenous factors including social fractionalization, dominant religion circa 1900, and war experience from the 19th century era of state formation. Controlling for a large set of competing explanations, we find a robust influence of egalitarianism distance on cross-national investment flows of bond and equity issuances, syndicated loans, and mergers and acquisitions. An informal cultural institution largely determined a century or more ago, egalitarianism exercises its effect on international investment via an associated set of consistent contemporary policy choices. But even after controlling for these associated policy choices, egalitarianism continues to exercise a direct effect on cross-border investment flows, likely through its direct influence on managers’ daily business conduct.
The purpose of this work is to identify and analyze the institutional constraints to innovative development of Russian enterprises. The list of them suggested in this article includes the inconsistency of the education system and the labor market to the needs of the innovation economy, the weakness and inefficiency of the formal institutions, in particular, ensuring the protection of property rights, the imperfection of the financial system, inadequate transport infrastructure, depreciation of fixed assets and weak domestic demand for innovation. All of these factors are closely related, and correction of their negative impact on innovation requires complex solutions.
Russian media are often accused of succumbing to state pressure (or of being an instrument of such pressure) , subordinating to power and, by implication, of being excessively dependent on state financing . In this contribution we are trying to systematically understand and analyze how the Russian state, in its post-Soviet incarnation, incorporates (or envisions incorporation of) the media into the national system of public institutions, and indeed how the state develops and implements public policy in respect of Russian media, are much more rare. Such analysis is, of course, complicated by the dual nature of media in Russia and in many other countries – on the one hand, as a branch of the economy and a market player among many, and on the other hand a purveyor of information, interpreter of cultural codes, and provider of public goods .
In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of ‘collective dominance’ and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of ‘conscious parallelism’ among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analysed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behaviour in concentrated industries discussed.