Торговая практика компании как политика по соблюдению требований антимонопольного законодательства
Article contains analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on freedom of expression, in which the Court had to balance public interest against the protection of commercial structures from unfair competition or injury to their business reputation.
Legal protection from acts of unfair competition requires application of efficient government measures towards offenders. These measures should guarantee private and public interests, and also to promote discontinuation of a violation and restoration of the position of a victim. These legal remedies have their own general features and peculiarities both in France and Russia. Fore example, according to the French law, courts play a key role in application of sanctions. At the same time, France has wide experience of application of civil sanctions imposed for unfair competition which may be of use to domestic public authorities.
In the present article, the author has made an effort to summarize objective and subjective essential elements of offences in the sphere of antimonopoly legislation according to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.