Религиоведение: от дисциплины к науке?
Using science of religion as an example the article criticizes modern (post)positivistic demarcation and shows its possibility and advantages on the basis of strict qualitative distinction between value and knowledge. The specificity of value and knowledge as irreducible and interactive phenomena is pointed out according to peculiarities of non-cognitive and cognitive acts of consciousness – feeling and reason. New criteria of demarcation depending on value or knowledge predominance are proposed, heterogeneity, decline and perspectives of science of religion as science (or of theology as non-cognitive discipline) are expected to be researched in view of this distinction.
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.
A joint research project carried out by an interdisciplinary group of Russian and Swedish linguists, sociologists and educators-psychologists (the Swedish Institute grant), besides solving pragmatic tasks of finding out relative quantitative-qualitative specificity of national cognitive representations of values, first of all, had methodological goals. They were to check the efficiency of the linguistic methods developed in this study (and, thus, to prove the theoretical ideas that served the basis for it) of getting factual data that allow reconstructing and comparing of the corresponding areas of cognitive representations.
The results of cross-cultural research of implicit theories of innovativeness among students and teachers, representatives of three ethnocultural groups: Russians, the people of the North Caucasus (Chechens and Ingushs) and Tuvinians (N=804) are presented. Intergroup differences in implicit theories of innovativeness are revealed: the ‘individual’ theories of innovativeness prevail among Russians and among the students, the ‘social’ theories of innovativeness are more expressed among respondents from the North Caucasus, Tuva and among the teachers. Using the structural equations modeling the universal model of values impact on implicit theories of innovativeness and attitudes towards innovations is constructed. Values of the Openness to changes and individual theories of innovativeness promote the positive relation to innovations. Results of research have shown that implicit theories of innovativeness differ in different cultures, and values make different impact on the attitudes towards innovations and innovative experience in different cultures.