ПРОБЛЕМА ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТИ ПОЗНАЮЩЕГО СУБЪЕКТА В ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИИ

Вестник Московского университета. Серия 7: Философия. 2022. С. 1–12.

Адамов М. С.

Translator: Адамов М. С.

The new direction in epistemology - virtue epistemology - shifts the emphasis from the problem of the truth of knowledge to the problem of the nature of the knowing subject, thought henceforth not as a consumer of knowledge, who acquires objective knowledge, independent of the knower himself, but as its source, or producer. This formulation of the problem raises a number of questions that need to be resolved. In particular, the question of what and how the researcher's responsibility can be guaranteed: obviously, fostering responsibility for the production of new knowledge should be the natural task of educating the intellectual virtue of such a cognitive subject. But no less important is the task of ensuring its morality. In dealing with this issue, this article proposes to analyze the possibility of combining the positions of reliabilism and responsibilism, two directions of virtue epistemology, and developing on the basis of their dialogue a new conceptually framed idea of scientific subjectivity through the development in the cognitive agent of appropriate intellectual virtues. The problem arises in the conceptual validity in the virtue epistemology of the morality of the responsible individual, which gives rise to the search for such foundations in the concepts it proposes and the accompanying search for a solution to the problem of the «evil genius».

Keywords: благо, истина, cognitive abilities, когнитивные способности, truth, производство знания, Good, knowledge production, epistemology of virtues, эпистемология добродетелей, problem of responsibility, intellectual virtues, subject morality, epistemic luck, проблема ответственности, интеллектуальные добродетели, моральность субъекта, эпистемическая удача