The mortality rates from homicides and suicides, which serve as an indicator of the psychological well-being and the value of life in society, show a steady decline after the 2000s in Russia. However, another block of causes of death, event of undetermined intent shows the same rapid growth and since 2014 already exceeds the cumulative death rate from homicides and suicides. Researchers believe this block of causes is a reservoir of latent homicides and suicides. As a result, actual data on homicides and suicides are underestimated. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that regional practices of coding the causes of death can largely deform the structure of mortality, which is why the ordinary proportional redistribution of event of undetermined intent within the class “External causes of morbidity and mortality” ICD-10 is not enough. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the actual death rates from homicides and suicides using a model region in which the proportion of event of undetermined intent is minimal. Three options for solving this problem are proposed. The suicide rate increased by 30% regardless of the hypothesis. At the same time, the level of homicides and accidents increased most significantly under the third hypothesis, when all cases of events of undetermined intent were redistributed – there was an increase of 30% compared to 15–20% for the first hypothesis. Assessment for regions, depending on the accepted hypothesis of redistribution of events of undetermined intent, showed differences, demonstrating an underestimation of specific causes of death. In some regions, ill-defined causes are used mainly to hide deaths from suicide (for example, Astrakhan, Samara, Sakhalin and Samara regions, as well as Tuva), and in other regions to conceal homicides (Orel and Vologda regions, Bashkortostan).
Today most countries are experiencing fast population aging, which is going to last the entire 21st century. Its economic effects are multifarious and will in large part shape further dynamics of the global economy not only in the short or medium but also in the long run. Unfortunately, Russian economists and politicians are hardly aware of how diverse economic consequences of population aging are since their attention is focused on its narrow, purely pragmatic, dimensions (such as the raising of pension age, the deficit of the Russian Pension Fund etc.). The paper provides a broad overview of major economic effects of population aging from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. It examines the place of aging in the process of demographic transition, and forecasts its expected trends in subsequent decades for a few countries including Russia. Next, it critically reviews different versions of dependency/support ratios: demographic and economic; chronological and prospective; non-adjusted and adjusted for differences by age in labor income and per capita consumption. Special attention is paid to a basic scheme of relationships between key demographic and macroeconomic variables that highlights how population aging might affect employment, labor productivity, capital intensity, wages, returns to capital, investment and savings. Some additional effects are also analyzed, such as prospective changes in labor supply, human capital accumulation, technological change, real interest, and inflation. A general conclusion is that population aging is not per se a fundamental economic challenge that should endanger society’s welfare. Real dangers arise from existing institutions providing support for the elderly, which were established in the early to mid 20th century under completely different demographic and economic conditions.
The paper examines the role of migration in Russia in achieving the government's strategic goals of population growth and ensuring natural growth by 2024. For the migration forecasting, cohort-component method and the algorithms of replacement migration are used. As a result, annual migration growth of 300-304 thousand people is required to maintain the current population size within next five years. Annual migration growth of 6.0-8.9 million people is needed to ensure natural growth. The last means that the goal will not be fulfilled.
In the middle of last century, life expectancy at birth in Russia was similar to that of other European countries. However, from 1964, it slowly declined, with male life expectancy falling by 7·5 years to the nadir of 57·4 years in 1994 after the collapse of the Soviet Union (with an equivalent decrease of 2·3 years in women to 71·1 years). After a slow restoration to the year 2005, life expectancy is increasing at an unprecedented pace of 0·82 years per year, reaching 67·5 years for men and 77·6 years for women in 2017. Pessimists might say that this is just a rebound effect, restoring previous loss rather than indicating continued growth. This question was addressed in a study
in 2014, where the authors cautiously concluded that the increase in Russian life expectancy is a result of the national project to address health care and other state measures. Some of the same authors are now asking whether the current life expectancy in Russia is consistent with the country's wealth.