Brams–Taylor model of fairdivision for divisible and indivisible items
In this article, the fairdivision problem for two participants in the presence of both divisible and indivisibleitems is considered. Three interrelated modifications of the notion of fairdivision–profitably, uniformly and equitably fairdivisions–were introduced. Computationally efficient algorithm for finding all of them was designed. The algorithm includes repetitive solutions of integer knapsack-type problems as its essential steps. The necessary and sufficient conditions of the existence of proportional and equitable division were found. The statements of the article are illustrated by various examples.
The situation of the negotiations’ high variability and difficulties of the result submission became the reason of the difficulties with their laboratory reproduction. In these conditions it is hard to estimate the impact of individual and personality differences on the process of negotiations, as to evaluate the degree and the direction of influence is possible only in comparison with the results of the conversation. This fact also creates difficulties for both development of effective methods of negotiation and creation of diagnostic norms for the personnel selection. As a result, case studies became popular as a method for laboratory reproduction of the negotiations situation, though the efficiency of this method is seriously questioned. The analysis of the errors of the interpreted results of the psychological studies on negotiations, taken with numerous proceedings on mathematical modeling of situations of negotiations, allowed us to develop a new approach to the problem of the efficiency evaluation of the negotiation process. This approach is based on comparative analysis of the subjective importance of the negotiations results and the value of the declined alternatives, which is made in specific cases limited up to 10 situation alternatives. The importance of all the alternatives results is evaluated using subjective indicators as well as objective ones.
This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in whichsubjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjectsearned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In thenormal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that bothin the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweighcompetitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence thateffort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our resultssuggest that fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stakelevels.
The article examines the stages of the negotiation process on the determination of the Caspian sea legal status, positions of the Russian Federation and the interests of the external actors (USA, EU, China) in the process. At present the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have reached the consensus on the delimitation of the north part of the Caspian sea while its southern part is still not delimited. The active interaction of the Caspian states with the external actors (USA, EU, China) encourages the Caspian states to strengthen their rights in the Caspian sea which in turn activates the negotiation process on the definition of the Caspian sea legal status.
A new set of axioms and new method (equal gap seeding) are designed. The equal gap seeding is the unique seeding that, under the deterministic domain assumption, satisfies the delayed confrontation, fairness, increasing competitive intensity and equal rank differences axioms. The equal gap seeding is the unique seeding that, under the linear domain assumption, maximizes the probability that the strongest participant is the winner, the strongest two participants are the finalists, the strongest four participants are the quarterfinalists, etc.