Бесполезная свобода и проблема ада
This paper examines the problem of practical and social significance of the belief in free will on the example of Derk Pereboom’s theory of hard incompatibilism. First, I present the general elements of hard incompatibilism focusing on its positive aspects that involve a forward‑looking approach to moral responsibility and a proposal to replace a number of allegedly destructive reactive attitudes with less damaging and more constructive ones. Second, I elaborate and discuss the gen‑ eral logic of moral justification that, as I argue, underlies Pereboom’s approach. I further argue that this logic entails the irrelevance of the belief in free will for moral justification of social practices. Third, I outline the main features of the problem of hell in order to show that hell could not be morally justified in Pereboom’s logic of moral justification. Then I show that the idea of hell provides a unique example where the belief in libertarian free will plays a crucial role in the structure of moral justification. On this basis, I argue that while the belief in free will is mostly irrelevant for the justification of social practices, it might play a crucial role in the justifications of religious practices that involve the belief in hell.