Санкции и контрсанкции: использование политических инструментов для реализации экономических целей
This article reviews discriminatory measures of the Western countries against Russia and Russia’s reciprocal response as protectionism for attaining the economic goals of the countries initiating the restrictions.
The research specifies the existing terminology, demonstrates that sanctions can be imposed only by the supranational organization that has respective authority in relation to its members. We also analyze the benefits and losses of the discriminatory measures.
Embargo and financial restrictions against Russia are viewed as extreme forms of competition among national economies. We suggest evaluating the effectiveness of commodity and capital restrictions by comparing benefits and losses from them for the national economy, rather than the assessment of losses for counterparties. We applied methods of logic and statistical analysis, including graphic visualization.
Having analyzed the outcome of Russia’s protectionist measures to restrict the competition in agriculture, we found that sectors with a short pay-back period saw a rapid growth in production, and replaced imported goods. Sectors that need substantial investment rearranged the geography of supplies.
Conclusions and Relevance
In the short run, the boycott appears more effective than embargo, since it pushes growth in industries covered with a protectionist shield, while the embargo can be circumvented with a variety of trading ties in the global economy. In the long run, the boycott will not have an adverse effect on the competitiveness of the protected sectors, while the embargo impedes economic growth and effective development of the sectors suffering the restrictions.