К истокам герменевтической концепции: эпистолярный нарратив Густава Шпета
The expansion of the methodological field, the variability, and diversity of scientific approaches in the 20-21th centuries leads to the fact that at present an increasing number of humanities scholars, in search of a certain subject constant, turns to archival materials (notes, drafts, epistolary heritage). These sources, as a rule, contain existential narratives that make it possible to clarify the origins of conceptual constructions. In the article, the epistolary narrative is considered as a kind of “sphere of conversation” (the concept of A. Ben), a special type of communication, i.e. as a field for the analysis of the hermeneutical concept of G.G. Shpet and revealing its intellectual and existential sources. It is shown that the fairy tale letter “Little Girl Tsvetolubochka” (as an example of an epistolary narrative), which Shpet wrote for his daughter Marguerite in 1914, and his later discussions about the specifics of different types of understanding, given by him in the report “Art as a kind of knowledge” (1927), meaningfully intersect. The problem of understanding the meaning posed by Shpet in the 7th chapter of the book “Phenomenon and Meaning” (1914) is symbolically transformed (appears in poetic forms of the word) into a narrative (fairy tale). This “flow of meaning” from one external form to another (while maintaining the internal form) is then conceptualized by Shpet in the book “The Internal Form of the Word” (1927). At the same time, the author compares the specific hermeneutic techniques used by Shpet in an epistolary narrative with methodological ideas of F. Schleiermacher and H.-G. Gadamer.
Human communication is basically the exchange of information. How can this be realized? Each communicant proceeds from a subjective perception of an objective reality; however in order to exchange information relating to this reality communicants are obliged to coordinate their perceptions. Each of us entertains personal experiences based on individual impressions and associations. But communication presupposes the presence of a common experience and the possibility of the coordination of subjective perceptions. It is presumed that communicants share common experiences: this seems to be the natural premise of communication.
How is this possible? How can I be certain, for example, that my interlocutor understands the words in the same way I do? How can we correlate our understanding? It seems obvious that the necessary condition of communication is an agreement between the communicants. But how can this agreement be reached? Where is the initial point of the coordination of individual experience of different persons?
The present book deals with this and related questions. Special attention is given to the role of deixis in the process of communication and to the mechanisms of linguistic comprehension.
The article discusses one argument in favor of descriptive theory of reference of proper names against the theory of direct reference which appeals to a famous example of the ship of Theseus. The author defends the latter theory by means of distinguishing the object of direct reference and its principles of individuation. The argument is discussed with reference to the works of H. Chandler, L. Linsky, S. Kripke, N. Salmon and other theorists.
The article describes the multilingualism of the austrian writer V. Vertlib as the source of his literary creativity.
In March 2011 scholars met in Prague at the conference Interculturalism, Meaning and Identity. This event revitalised this important theme related to Diversity and Recognition. The terms 'interculturalism' and 'integration' are experiencing a renaissance. As the extent of human movement between nations increases attempts are made to balance cultural difference and social cohesion. In some contexts immigration and settlement policies are becoming more draconian in response. Because of this, interculturalism can take on many meanings. However, pivotal to the way interculturalism is understood is identification. As the relationship between nation, ethnicity and language becomes more complex so too do the ways in which people represent them selves. The cultural resources drawn on and the processes used to form identities are examined in this truly international collection. So too are the implications of these developments for how we theorise culture, meaning and identity.
This article deals with reconstruction of representations of V. Frankl about the Person as a basis of an individualization and self$formation. Methodological bases of V. Frankl-understanding of the Person in philosophical anthropology of M. Sheler and psychological categories by means of which the process of actualization of humans personal origin is described are considered, and also is given the estimation of sights of V. Frankl from a point of view of a range of the problems solved by psychology of the personality.
личность, свобода, ценности, Совесть, смысл, person, freedom, Values, conscience, meaning
The article identifies and justifies the distinction between subjective and event-driven approach in psychology way of life of the individual. Position disclosed approaches to key issues of psychology way of life: determination and self-determination, the lifetime of the person, life development and maturity. Outlines possible prospects for cooperation and integration approaches.
Meaningful life is emotionally marked off. That’s the general point that Johansen (IPBS: Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 44, 2010) makes which is of great importance. Fictional abstractions use to make the point even more salient. As an example I’ve examined Borges’ famous fiction story. Along with the examples of Johansen it provides an informative case of exploring symbolic mechanisms which bind meaning with emotions. This particular mode of analysis draws forth poetry and literature in general to be treated as a “meaningful life laboratory”. Ways of explanation of emotional effect the art exercises on people, which had been disclosed within this laboratory, however, constitute a significant distinction in terms that I have designated as “referential” and “substantive”. The former appeals to something that has already been charged with emotional power, whereas the latter comes to effect by means of special symbolic mechanisms creating the emotional experience within the situation. Johansen, who tends to explain emotions exerted by the art without leaving the semiotic perspective, is drawn towards the “referential” type of explanation. Based upon discussions in theory of metaphor and Robert Witkin’s sociological theory of arts it is demonstrated an insufficient of “referential” explanation. To overcome a monopoly of “referential” explanation of emotional engagement, in particular, in literature, means to break away from the way of reasoning, stating endless references to “something else”, presupposing the existence of something already significant and therefore sharing its effects.
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.