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## Структура российского сообщества экономистов и его отношение к российским экономическим журналам. Ч. 1. Анализ методами латентных классов и теории коллективного выбора

The paper is focused on the analysis of the structure of Russian academic economic community based on a survey of participants of several Russian economic conferences, and on the analysis of the opinion of this community on some Russian scientific journals on economics and related disciplines. The first part of the work is devoted to the division of the economic community into three main groups: university professors, academic researchers and expert analysts, each of which can be conventionally split into «advanced» and «traditional»specialists. The opinion of the community and its subgroups about scientific importance, prestige and interest in some economic journals was studied and several ratings of these journals were built based on studied opinion.

A set of related majority rule-based social choice correspondences are considered: the union of minimal *Р*-dominating sets MPD (Duggan 2011, Subochev 2016) the union of weakly stable sets MWS (Aleskerov & Kurbanov 1999), the union of minimal *P*-externally stable sets MPES (Wuffl et al. 1989, Subochev 2008) and the union of minimal *R*-externally stable sets MRES (Aleskerov & Subochev 2009, 2013). These tournament solutions have not attracted much attention so far. However, the analysis of their properties suggests that MPES and MRES can be useful as instruments of choice, for instance when it is necessary to aggregate rankings. Their implementation is also possible under certain conditions.

The results presented are the following.

1) In a general case of a topological space of alternatives, a sufficient and necessary condition has been provided for an alternative to belong to a minimal *P*-dominating set. This characteristic condition is related to some version of the covering relation. It has been established that the union of minimal *P*-dominating sets and the uncovered set are logically nested neither in a general case, nor in finite tournaments. The characterization obtained provides a sufficient condition of nonemptiness of MPES and MRES in a general case of a topological space of alternatives.

2) It has been found that MPES and MRES both satisfy the following axioms:

a) monotonicity with respect to changes in social preferences (*P*-monotonicity),

b) the generalized Nash independence of irrelevant alternatives,

c) the idempotence,

d) the Aizerman-Aleskerov property,

e) the independence of social preferences for irrelevant alternatives (the independence of losers),

but they do not satisfy the extension axiom (Sen’s property g). It has also been demonstrated that MPD satisfies neither of these axioms, and MWS satisfies *P*-monotonicity only.

3) It has been found that MPES and MRES both satisfy Sanver monotonicity (a.k.a. cover monotonicity). Thus, despite they are not Maskin monotonic, these social choice correspondences can be implemented in a nonstandard setting, where actors have (extended) preferences for sets of alternatives. It has also been demonstrated that MPD and MWS do not satisfy Sanver monotonicity.

We use data on economic, management and political science journals to produce quantitative estimates of (in)consistency of evaluations based on seven popular bibliometric indicators (impact factor, 5-year impact factor, immediacy index, article influence score, h-index, SNIP and SJR). We propose a new approach to aggregating journal rankings: since rank aggregation is a multicriteria decision problem, ordinal ranking methods from social choice theory may solve it. We apply either a direct ranking method based on majority rule (the Copeland rule, the Markovian method) or a sorting procedure based on a tournament solution, such as the uncovered set and the minimal externally stable set. We demonstrate that aggregate rankings reduce the number of contradictions and represent the set of single-indicator-based rankings better than any of the seven rankings themselves.

The work is related to the detection of key international and Russian economic journals in cross-citation networks. A list of international journals and information on their cross-citations were taken from Web of Science (WoS) database while information on Russian journals was taken from Russian Science Citation Index (RSCI). We calculated classical centrality measures, which are used for key elements detection in networks, and proposed new indices based on short-range and long-range interactions. A distinct feature of the proposed methods is that they consider individual attributes of each journal and take into account only the most significant links between them. An analysis of 100 main international and 29 Russian economic journals was conducted. As a result, we detected journals with large number of citations to important journals and also journals where the observed rate of selfcitation is a dominant in the total level of citation. The obtained results can be used as a guidance for researchers planning to publish a new paper and as a measure of importance of scientific journals.

We consider the calculation of Nitzan-Kelly’s manipulability index in the impartial anonymous and neutral culture (IANC) model. We provide a new theoretical study of this model and an estimation for the maximal difference between manipulability indices in the IANC model and a basic model, the impartial culture (IC). The asymptotic behavior of this difference is studied with the help of the impartial anonymous culture (IAC) model. It is shown that the difference between the IAC and IANC models tends to zero as the number of alternatives or the number of voters grows. These results hold for any other probabilistic measure that is anonymous and neutral. Finally, we calculate Nitzan-Kelly’s index in the IANC model for four social choice rules and compare it with the IC model.

The paper presents some positive results in the Social Choice Theory, obtained using the clone method.