Можно ли выразить мистический опыт?
The paper is devoted to the analysis of the conceptions of consciousness that are presented as alternatives to reflective theory of consciousness: the conception of non-egological non-reflective consciousness (J.-P. Sartre) and the conception of pre-reflective self-consciousness (the Heidelberg school, D. Zahavi). The author shows that the conceptions are self-contradictory because they use reflection as a method of discovering the consciousness of the type that is transcendent to reflection.
This paper explores the theoretical difficulties arising from the treatment of the problem of the visibility of the subject by the philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The author attempts an interpretation of the glance of the other, described by Sartre in his Being and Nothingness, as a specific form of this kind of visibility, in order to demonstrate the ‘destructive’ potential of such description for Sartre’s own dualistic ontology. The analysis of the passages from Being and Nothingness where an encounter with the glance of the other is depicted brings into question at least two of the key oppositions in Sartre’s early works, imagination vs. perception and consciousness vs. object. As a result, the visibility of the subject, although given quite a persuasive account in Being and Nothingness, actually remains non-theorised (and, very likely, non-theorisable within the limits allowed by a dualist ontology). It would seem that it is Merleau-Ponty who should be able to solve the problem of theoretical justification of non-contradictory foundations of the visibility of the subject, since he is mainly interested in finding the common ground for various oppositions without nullifying the oppositions themselves. Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the opposition between imagination and perception in Sartre, however, being centered as it is on the notion of ‘ esh’ and, eventually, on the reversibility internal to vision, meets with dificulties once it is required to provide a solution to the second dichotomy, the one between consciousness and the object. Even though in Merleau-Ponty’s late work The Visible and the Invisible the visibility of the subject ceases to be problematic, his criticism of Sartre’s notion of ‘pre-reflexive consciousness’ still leads to his very definition of the position of the ‘subject’ (which already in early Sartre was equalized in status with the object) being ambiguous.
Lecture notes of the courses Merleau-Ponty delivered throughout 1950s at Sorbonne and Collège de France give evidence of the rst steps he was taking towards developing, in a polemic with Sartre, his own approach to the problem of imagination. These texts are brought under scrutiny in the present paper, with a special emphasis on the role of the experience of the Other which, in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, undermines Sartre’s opposition between perception and imagination. The author seeks to demonstrate both the efficiency and the inconsistency of Merleau-Ponty’s early endeavours to criticize Sartre’s theory of the imaginary, tracing down the development of his own approach to imagination starting from the privileged position given to the experience of the Other (which in itself is quite uncharacteristic of Merleau-Ponty’s view of the problem of the Other) as dissolving the boundaries between perception and imagination, and up to the moment when, as a result of his study of Freud, he comes to deny the experience of the Other any privileged status in favour of subordinating its allegedly specific nature to the general principle of perception. The conclusions reached in the course of this inquiry allow to suggest a significant parallel between the privileged place of the Other in Merleau-Ponty’s early critique of Sartre’s doctrine and the motive of the ‘gaze of things’ in his later theory of image.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.