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Article

Свобода в мире: защита экстерналистского либертарианства

This paper develops the libertarian deliberative externalist account of free will. In the first part, I discuss some problems with the existing libertarian theories using Kane’s theory of ultimate responsibility and O’Connors agent-causal theory as paradigmatic examples. I argue that some of the main problems of these theories are due to the isolation of the agent from the external world and to the weakening of the necessary connection between the agent’s personality and his actions. In the second part, I propose an alternative externalist account of libertarian freedom. I defend an externalist account of reasons for action that emphasize the importance of the objective facts in reasoning and decision-making process. Then I propose an account of the decision-making process that is indeterministically sensitive to the objective reasons for action. I argue that this account preserves both alternative possibilities and full causal control over the action. It although illuminates that some degree of luck is immanent to every decision making process.