Сукук как источник привлечения внешнего долгосрочного финансирования в условиях западных санкций
This paper deals with the phenomena of sukuk bonds rapid growth, Islamic securities, which stand out for their asset-based nature. The absence of optimal pricing strategies leads to refinement of the Islamic financing structures. Sukuk payment schemes, benefits and limitations of various types of Islamic bonds and their implication as a source of long-term funding are discussed. A set of policy actions towards the development of Islamic sukuk in Russia was designed.
The article is dedicated to historical analysis of crimes committed on securities market till the 20th century. Important part of the article is indication of economic conditions. Thanks for it the meaning of legal acts becomes clear. The author concludes on existence the developed securities market and necessary criminal rules to its protection.
The new 2014 edition features: The Global Leasing Report provides an exclusive overview of the international leasing industry providing data on volume and growth by region, market penetration, GDP penetration ratios and market shares; A ranking of the top 50 leasing markets by size worldwide; Detailed reviews of developments in Europe, North America, emerging markets, Islamic leasing, law and operating leases; Industry professionals discuss the implications of the revised lease accounting exposure draft due in 2014 and the changes it will bring to the global leasing markets; An in-depth information technology report projects leasing software trends for 2014; An extensive software section provides product reviews for all of the major lease software providers outlining product capabilities, recent enhancements, compatibility and availability; Concise market reviews for over 50 different countries worldwide cover all leasing sectors, each including detailed tables and charts offering data breakdown of growth rates, market penetration and business volumes.
Bank stabilization measures adopted by the Russian authorities since 2008 have benefited core state-owned financial institutions to a greater extent than other market participants. Public sector keeps swelling at the expense of domestic private sector. According to the author’s methodology, by January 2010 state-controlled banks possessed over 50 percent of all bank assets, thus putting Russia in the same league with China and India. Development banking and policy lending expand. A feature distinguishing Russia is gradual substitution of direct state control by indirect state ownership in the shape of corporate pyramids headed by state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks. We construct a dataset of bank-level statistical data for the period between 2001 and 2010 and find that quasi-private banks (indirectly state-owned banks) were the fastest growing subgroup. Nationalization and rehabilitation of failed banks was carried out by state-controlled banks and entities rather than by federal executive authorities directly. We suggest that the response of the Russian authorities to bank instability was consistent with long-term trends in the banking system evolution. Anti-crisis measures of 2008-9 re-aligned the sector with the traditional model of banking that rests upon dominant state-owned banks, directed lending, protectionism, administrative interference and elements of price controls. Increased government ownership of banks and control over lending activity are unlikely to be fully dismantled after the crisis is over. This scenario can nevertheless accommodate a tactical retreat of the state from non-core assets in the financial sector, leaving control over 3 largest institutions intact.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. We distinguish between banks that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
The process of the IPO of banks in Russia is its infancy but the rapid growth is forecasted. This context raises the issue of the factors determining the floated banks stock value. The results of the research on 2007-2009 Russian data showed that the bank stock price is dependent on the macroeconomic indicators (such as the oil prices and the Dow Jones index volatility) and the some banking system indicators(the interbank interest rate, the bank’s ROA, and ROE). However, the results adjusted to the global financial crisis effect proved to exclude the ROE factor and showed the dependence of the stocks prices of the floated banks from the historic trend of the American economy. The models developed are of the practical application and can be used by the institutional as well as the private investors.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
The article is dedicated of problems of criminal law regulation of securities market.The concept of criminal law mechanism its protection is offered.
During 1998-2010 the National Research University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow) has been surveying the results of activities of most leasing market operators in Russia, including all the largest ones. The results of the scheduled annual analysis undertaken by us to survey the activities of leasing companies in the Russia indicate that the year 2010 was successful for the leasing business. According to the Leaseurope, and author’s data, Russia occupies the 5th place in Europe after Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, French. In practice many Russian leasing companies have managed not only to copy but also successfully to adapt the experience of the countries with developed leasing industries. Despite the growth in new business, account must be taken of the quality of the leasing portfolio. It turned out that it just got a little better as compared with the previous year. The analysis showed that cost of loans taken for financing leasing operations, as well as the cost of the funds of a leasing company, the funds of the lessee, the use of factoring, promissory notes/exchange bills, securities and other instruments, depends on a variety of factors, including: financial independence of leasing companies; the risks associated with the sale of a leasing product; the security for the transaction; the terms of depreciation of leased property, the terms of credit contract and of leasing contracts; the currency of the leasing transaction; whether the funds are borrowed on the domestic or on the international capital market; the schemes for carrying out a leasing operation, etc. With each year there the number of Russian leasing companies that can obtain financing directly from foreign banks grows. There is a growth in the volume of credit operations with the involvement of the national agencies for insurance of export-import operations, e.g. from Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA and other countries. Securitisation of leasing assets held at the junction of four financial tools – lending, leasing, factoring, securities issues. This innovative mechanism that requires subtle scientific and practical configuration achieves remarkable economic performance update, modernisation and re-equipment of enterprises. The author has developed a system of securitisation leasing asset pricing which is feasible through a set of equations that balance the interests of the participants. The article also examined the status of concentration of leasing market, its regional and sectoral structures.
National Research University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow) and author has been researching the leasing market of Russia for 15 years. The results of the annual review shows that the 2011 year was successful for the leasing business. According to Leaseurope and author of Russia took the 5-th place in Europe after Germany, Britain, France, Italy. The article presents the dynamics that characterizes the development of market in the country by value of new contracts, the largest leasing portfolios, calculated author of segmental structure of the leasing market and regional structure. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the factors influencing the big-ticket deals, because they account for about 70% of the total portfolio. The article presents results of regression analysis for large-scale transactions, 247 correlation of price formation on leasing services depending on the cost of funding, advances, interest rate, duration of contracts, the margin of the lessor. Exploring the structure of financing of leasing operations, the author has developed a new approach to determining leverage leasing projects.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.