Vishnevskiy K., Meissner D., Egorova O. Science, Technology and Innovation. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. 45/STI/2015.
This paper describes an approach to foresight for SME enterprises. Foresight has become a frequently used tool for technology and innovation management generally limited large corporations. Presumably this is mainly due to the complexity of the corporate foresight concept itself and the need to invest substantial resources. To overcome this challenge and make corporate foresight also applicable for small and medium sized enterprises an adjusted methodological approach is developed taking into account the special requirements and limitations of SMEs. Based on an analysis of best practices for the development of theoretical and methodological approaches to foresight for SMEs an approach is developed taking into account the limitations of financial, human and time resources inherent to SMEs is introduced.
Added: Aug 17, 2015
Tkachenko A., Valbonesi P., Shadrina E. V. et al. Marco Fanno Working Paper . University of Padova. University of Padova, 2019. No. 240.
Government support to small business enterprises (SBEs) through set- aside (SA) public procurement auctions is a common practice. The effect of the SA mechanism is, however, ambiguous. On the one hand, SA auc- tions can attract more SBEs to compete; on the other hand, SA auctions restrict the entry of—possibly—more cost-efficient large firms. We inves- tigate SA auctions’ effect by exploiting an original Russian database on public procurement e-auctions for granulated sugar (a largely homoge- neous good) in the period 2011-2013. To identify the causal effect of SA auctions, we overcome two endogeneity issues: procurers’ choice of SA for- mat and firms’ decision to bid. In an empirical setting where confounding elements are minimized, we found that SA auctions’ effect largely depends on both the reserve price value and the level of competition. We found that there exists an optimal interval for the reserve price where SA auc- tions record lower procurement prices, as compared to non-SA auctions.
Added: Nov 7, 2019
Красавина Р. А. Вестник экономики, права и социологии. 2012. № 1. С. 66-70.
Added: Jun 30, 2012
Разработка комплексных инструментов оценки эффективности малого бизнеса на основе искусственного интеллекта (на примере предприятий Пермского края)
Лозинская А. М., Тавафиев А. Ф. В кн.: Теория управления и математическое моделирование: труды конференции. Ижевск, 15-18 мая 2012 г.. Ижевск: Издательство ИжГТУ, 2012. С. 64-67.
Added: Jun 4, 2012
Семенова М. В. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2005. № 01.
The introduction of institutions of credit information sharing – private credit bureaus and public credit registries & in the market for bank loans represent one of the possible solutions of information asymmetry problem which the creditors tend to face. However the possibility of information sharing influences the bank’s incentives in two different ways. While it disciplines the borrowers and, therefore, reduces the share of bad loans, a bank loses the competitive advantage, namely the monopolistic knowledge about the data in its clients’ credit histories. Does the bank have an opportunity at its disposal to use the benefits of information sharing without losing its competitive advantage and its clientele? One way to do so is to report false data on borrowers. This paper analyses the bank’s incentives for such opportunistic behavior and describes the impact of false information reporting on the characteristics of market equilibrium. The opportunity to get extra profit and to offer less expensive credit to new clients explains why banks prefer the strategy of dishonest behavior. The paper outlines the role of the informational intermediary in quality control for the data contained in credit reports. Also it describes the conditions under which verification of a certain share of reports provides that the parameters characterizing the equilibrium are equal to those in no information asymmetry situation.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Added: Jan 11, 2013
М.: Весь мир, 2010.
Added: Apr 30, 2013
Концептуальный подход к созданию кадрового и инфраструктурного обеспечения национальной инновационной системы на базе высшего профессионального образования
Митрофанов С. А., Леохин Ю. Л., Митрофанов А. С. Качество. Инновации. Образование. 2010. № 5. С. 2-8.
Added: Apr 12, 2012
Курганов М. А. В кн.: Современный менеджмент. Проблемы, гипотезы, исследования: сб.работ третьей межвуз. научн.-практ. студ. конф.: в 2 кн.. Кн. 1. Пермь: Редакционно-издательский отдел НИУ ВШЭ-Пермь, 2015. Гл. 2. С. 14-30.
Added: Apr 18, 2018
Балковская Д. В. В кн.: Инновационное развитие современных социально-экономических систем. Всероссийская научно-практическая конференция (2011, Волгоград). Волгоград; М.: Центр прикладных научных исследований, 2011. С. 187-195.
Added: Oct 12, 2012
Экономика и управление: проблемы и перспективы развития. Сборник научных статей по итогам международной научно-практической конференции г.Волгоград 15-16 ноября 2010 г.
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Added: Feb 22, 2013
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Яковлев А. А. Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 4. С. 21-37.
Added: Sep 22, 2012
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Уринсон Я. М. Вестник Европы. 2014. № 38-39.
Added: Feb 5, 2018
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Карпов А. В., Вольский В. И. Полития: Анализ. Хроника. Прогноз. 2011. № 2. С. 162-174.
Added: Jun 24, 2011