The theoretical basis of work is the notion of legitimation as a complex mechanism of social approval of a new phenomenon taking place with the active participation of different social groups and structures, able to influence its final form. In the focus of the empirical analysis the representations of social entrepreneurship that main actors of its legitimacy in Russia have. Among them are: the state, foundations, NPOs and business. We assess the (in)consistency between their representations as well as the reflection of these representations in the characteristics of existing organizations of social entrepreneurship (social enterprises).
Business, government and NPOs are understood as external actors of social enterprise legitimation, as without their recognition the legitimation will not take place. In turn, social enterprises, regardless of whether they come from for-profit or non-profit sector, are seen as objects of legitimation, or as a new actor, not identical to any of the above. It is shown that the contradictions in the positions of key actors can lead to mutually exclusive projects of legitimation of a new phenomenon, so that they will undermine the cognitive and moral legitimacy of each other. The empirical data include the results of the authors survey of 202 social enterprises.
Institutions affect investment decisions, including investments in human capital. Hence institutions are relevant for the allocation of talent. Good market-supporting institutions attract talent to productive value-creating activities, whereas poor ones raise the appeal of rent-seeking. We propose a theoretical model that predicts that more talented individuals are particularly sensitive in their career choices to the quality of institutions, and test these predictions on a sample of around 95 countries of the world. We find a strong positive association between the quality of institutions and graduation of college and university students in science, and an even stronger negative correlation with graduation in law. Our findings are robust to various specifications of empirical models, including smaller samples of former colonies and transition countries. The quality of human capital makes the distinction between educational choices under strong and weak institutions particularly sharp. We show that the allocation of talent is an important link between institutions and growth.