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Субъективность и темпоральность как условия возможности опыта: отождествление или разграничение?
The article analyzes the tendency in transcendental-phenomenological philosophy to identify the concepts of subjectivity and temporality. The key challenge for the philosophical tradition is the problem of the unity of conscious experience. The classical solution of the problem is that contents of consciousness are unified by their belonging to me. But D. Hume doubts the phenomenological validity of such solution: the perceptions are given to us as they are, namely, as having a separate existence from each other in a stream. It appears that on the basis of the stream it is impossible to justify not only the existence of identical Self, but, as Hume acknowledges in his Appendix to the Treatise, the existence of a persistent bundle of perceptions. This indicates the need to complete the phenomenological method with transcendental one.
An important step to identification of subjectivity and temporality is the Kantian solution to the problem of self-consciousness as necessary condition for unified conscious experience. According to Kant, the difficulty that lies in the question “how can the subject have an internal intuition of itself” is common to every theory, and therefore nothing remains but to abandon the question and recognize that self-consciousness brought about by self-affectation is an essential feature of subjectivity. As a result the study of subjectivity is reduced to the study of conscious cognitive processes, and temporality – their indispensable characteristic – is accepted as “absolute subjectivity” (E. Husserl). The work of subjectivity is understood as temporalization, and subjectivity itself – as time (M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre).
The author shows that the reliance on temporality in the understanding of subjectivity creates a problem of formal character of connections between conscious contents, and the problem can be solved only by considering the preconscious level of subjectivity.