The Ontological Dimension of Language in H. G. Gadamer 's Hermeneutics
The subject of the analysis is the problem of interrelation of language, understanding, and being in H.-G. Gadamer's Hermeneutics. The analysis is focused on Gadamer's equivocal and ambiguous thesis that "being that can be understood is language". The author reveals the fundamentally ontological background of Gadamer's hermeneutical analysis of language, and critically rethinks the interpretation of this thesis by a prominent researcher Jean Grondin.
The article shows the importance of philosophy Ricker for theoretical sociology. Perspectives of sociology associated with a combination of theories and theories of action events. Action theory developed in sociology and theory of events is not. Ricoeur philosophy - one of the possible intellectual resources in order to change this situation.
This study deals with the reception of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology in Martin Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The study targets those elements common to the two philosophic systems that explain how the phenomenology influences the launch of Martin Heidegger's basic philosophic attitudes, namely, Husserl's theory of intentionality and perception, material a priori and categorical contemplation, and specifically Husserl's transcendental philosophy.
There were attempts to discovered the nature of the unique dialogue between philosopher Strahov and his famous contemporaries and opponents: Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and others in the monograph
Structured monograph on the subjects of tolerance and intercultural understanding - scientific foundations, the organization process, specific ways and methods.
This paper examines ontological and phenimenological strategies of Buddhism in general and the Buddhist school (darśana) of mādhyamaka. The mādhyamaka’s “śūnyata” (emptiness), for example, is comparable with “Nothingness” in Western existential tradition (though they are not absolutely similar) and we can discover primacy of negativity in both cases. We also try to substantiate that the position of mādhyamaka was a radical nihilism and not scepticism contrary to the opinion of a number of modern buddologists. And what is also important for us is the problem of the “unhappy consciousness” (the Buddhist “duḥkha”) and different attitudes of thinkers towards it.
This paper examines ontological strategies of Western existential philosophy (its “atheistic” current) and the Buddhist school (darśana) of mādhyamaka. We can discover similar phenomenological strategies together with extreme differences in anthropology and the value purposes (personalism and deconstruction of classic European subject in the existential philosophy and radical impersonalism of Buddhism). We suppose that Heidegger, Sartre and Buddhism have comparable theories of consciousness. The mādhyamaka’s “śūnyata” (emptiness) is comparable with Heideggers’s and Sartre’s “Nothingness” (though they are not absolutely similar) and we can discover primacy of negativity in both cases. We also try to substantiate that the position of mādhyamaka was a radical nihilism and not scepticism contrary to the opinion of a number of modern buddologists. And what is also important for us is the problem of the “unhappy consciousness” (be it the Buddhist “duḥkha” or “Sorge”of Heidegger, or Sartre’s “Nausea”) and different attitudes of thinkers towards it.
The article in question considers all stages of “life” of a work of verbal art, from nascency to perception, from the point of view of the hermeneutical approach to understanding, at the same time the latter is separated from interpretation. Considerable attention is devoted to the dialectics of interrelation between the objective and the subjective in literature, to the analysis of the dialogic character of understanding, as well as to the influence of language on the author’s thought. Widely spread pessimism regarding the possibility of understanding is jettisoned; on the other hand, the superficial, interpretive approach to understanding is also rejected. Aspiration for attaining genuine understanding, attempts to break through the thick crust of obstacles (and yet not yielding to any “mystical” temptation!) are emphasised and encouraged for their high moral significance.
This work shows that being must originally be understood as implication. We begin with what Heidegger calls Hegel’s ‘new concept of being’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit: time as history is the essence of being. This concept however, is not univocal—for supersession means destroying-preserving. Hegel shows himself to be the thinker of truth as essentially ambiguous; and the Phenomenology is onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, the history of the being and unity, time and aspect, of the concept’s ambiguity. For Heidegger however, conceptual ambiguity confirms that Hegel’s history of being is stuck in a vulgar interpretation of time; and the Phenomenology can explain neither the origin of this time, nor the necessity of negation for the historical determination of being—for Hegel cannot think the ground of the concept of being, that is, the grounding of the ground. If Heidegger argues however, that the Phenomenology is predetermined by its ancient point of departure, we must go back to the Greeks, back to Aristotle’s original insight (overlooked by the entire history of philosophy as metaphysics): being and unity imply one another—for they are essentially implications. Thus the question of the meaning of being becomes the question of the meaning of implication.
Human communication is basically the exchange of information. How can this be realized? Each communicant proceeds from a subjective perception of an objective reality; however in order to exchange information relating to this reality communicants are obliged to coordinate their perceptions. Each of us entertains personal experiences based on individual impressions and associations. But communication presupposes the presence of a common experience and the possibility of the coordination of subjective perceptions. It is presumed that communicants share common experiences: this seems to be the natural premise of communication.
How is this possible? How can I be certain, for example, that my interlocutor understands the words in the same way I do? How can we correlate our understanding? It seems obvious that the necessary condition of communication is an agreement between the communicants. But how can this agreement be reached? Where is the initial point of the coordination of individual experience of different persons?
The present book deals with this and related questions. Special attention is given to the role of deixis in the process of communication and to the mechanisms of linguistic comprehension.