Аргумент «зомби» и проблема априорной выводимости
The present paper deals with the latest version of Chalmers’ zombie argument which constitutes a serious challenge to materialism in the philosophy of mind. That version includes T- and I- clauses aimed to cope with some recent objections. J. Levine has demonstrated that so-called “Q factor” plays an important role in the argument justification. “Q factor”, though connected with “a priori entailment” problem, is considered by J. Levine apart from “I factor”. In accordance with his view we propose an alternative and more fundamental explanation for both “Q” and “I” factors’ role in the zombie argument. The key point of our approach is that supervenience conditional should be reformulated as a counterfactual one.
The metasemantic version of two-dimensionalism developed by R. Stalnaker is considered in the connection with the opposition "logic as calculus" vs. "logic as uversal medium". Some philosophical and methodological advantages of such approach are pointed out.
This article provides an analysis of philosophical background of two-dimensionalism in general and some its particular variants. The paper demonstrates that two-dimensionalism should be treated not as artificial addition to conventional possible worlds semantics but as its natural generalization. It is also shown how ontological and epistemological problems (the correlation between primary and secondary intensions, apriority and necessity, the nature of «mixed» truths etc.) could be converted into pragmatic ones.
In the article position of S. Kripke, which is presented in his lectures "Identity and necessity", is considered. The thesis is proved that necessity of identity for names with strict reference will be carried out on the whole universum of such names, as non-descriptive names do not have their own sense. It excludes for them reference to various objects (or to classes of objects). The identity of non-descriptive names is possible only in a case poly-naming of the same object or of the same class of homogeneous objects (in case of a general non-descriptive name).
The paper raises the question as how we can include the category of subject within physicalist ontology without postulating metaphysical freedom of will. Significance of the issue is justified through the analysis of the notion of subject in the everyday moral discourse. Suggested answer can be described as compatibilistic. Author claims that category of the subject might be highlighted in the physical world, if we could find its causally effective feature, and such feature is intentionality.
The paper deals with the Ontological Argument and focuses on the enigmatic Anselmian concept «majus» (within the expression «id quo majus cogitari neguit»). Four different explications of this concept are considered. The conclusion is that the most productive and non-trivial explication is based on two-dimensional approach to the possible worlds semantics. А formal reconstruction of Anselm's proof in terms of AML (modal logic with an actuality operator) is given.
Already within the framework of the principle of phenomenological intentionality, one is dealing with the existence of a certain inevitable intertwining of the perspective and the object upon which this perspective is directed, or, in other words, the intertwining of the object of consciousness and that of which one is conscious is guaranteed, as is their initial unity. If we try to apply to consciousness any ‘type’ of relationship or subject–object schemes, then we immediately come up against paradoxes. It is impossible to determine consciousness by means of subject–object, not only because it is not an object, nor a subject, but also because consciousness inevitably turns out to be “prior” to all other similar distinctions. Therefore consciousness is not an object that can be enumerated or related to some other object. It cannot be separated from us; we cannot step aside from it or distance ourselves from it, for consciousness is non-spatial.