Article
Гендерное равноправие и гендерные привилегии: цели и средства
On May 18-19, 2012, at the presidential retreat in Camp David in Maryland, U.S. president Barack Obama hosted the 38th annual G8 summit. The leaders discussed global economic growth, development, and peace and security. After less than 24 hours of face-to-face time among the leaders, they issued communiqué of only five pages. However, Camp David was a significant success. The leaders came together to effectively address the most pressing issues of the day while setting the direction for the summits that were to follow, including the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Chicago, the G20 in Los Cabos, Mexico, and the Rio+20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. That success was propelled by several causes. The first is the set of strong global shocks were particularly relevant to a number of items on the agenda. This included the newest installment of the euro-crisis, spikes in oil and food prices, and the escalating violence in Syria. The second is the failure of the other major international institutions to address these challenges. The third is the club’s dedication to the promotion of democracy and its significance on issues such as the democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa. The fourth is the high relative capabilities of G8 members, fuelled by the strength of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and the British pound. The fifth is the domestic political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment of the leaders in attendance. Camp David saw several G8 leaders returning for their sixth or seventh summit and leaders with a secure majority mandate and control of their legislative houses at home. Finally, the constricted participation at the remote and secluded Camp David Summit, a unique and original advantage of the G8 summit style, allowed for more spontaneous conversation and interpersonal bonds. Together, these interconnected causes brought the G8 back, as a broader, bigger, bolder centre of effective global governance.
In this article, author presents basic theoretical approaches in economy, sociology and demography, explaining the phenomenon of single-parenthood. In this paper, the following approaches are described: the theory of marriage (G. Becker), the transactional approach (R. Pollack), the family development theory and the family life cycle concept (E. Duval, R. Hill, P. Glikk), the theory of gender inequality (A. Cherlin) and the theory of the Second demographic transition (R. Lesteg, D. van de Kaa). Although such demographic events as the birth out of the marriage and divorce are the result of a conscious choice of the person, during long time they were considered by researchers as the events breaking normal sequence of stages of family development. The increase of nonmarital birth rate, the growth of the number of divorces and the widespread of cohabitations in the 1980th led to changes in matrimonial and reproductive behavior of people. These changes in behavior caused the revision of the existing approaches to the lonely parenthood, and the renewal of conceptual framework: the term “union” and “cohabitation” began be used together with the term "marriage", and the term "life cycle" was replaced by the term "life course".
This study aims to analyze differences between gender attitudes of migrants and local population in 8 countries of Western and Northern Europe. It tests whether migrants from developing countries, especially from the Muslim world, tend to follow European trends in their attitude towards gender equality or they tend to treat gender equality issues in the same manner as in their countries of origin. This topic is of particular importance as attitudes towards women’s rights are proven to be a strong predictor of support for democracy and of liberal values in general. This study uses the data of the 5th wave of the European Social Survey, a representative national sample for the most European societies. The results show that migrants are a little more conservative in their gender attitudes than local Europeans, but the influence of this factor is often overestimated, whereas age and level of education exceed migrant status and Islam as predictors of liberal or conservative gender attitudes. Moreover, attitudes towards women’s rights among migrants are very similar to the attitudes of the local population in any particular country. Consequently, migrants in the most liberal countries such as Sweden show more support for gender equality than locals in Germany or Switzerland. However, Muslim religion remains a robust medium-sized negative predictor of gender attitudes.