Система государственных и муниципальных закупок в РФ: анализ механизмов повышения информационной открытости
An electronic auction, as one of the relatively new methods of procurement, has both positive aspects and disadvantages. The article briefly discusses the prospect of extending electronic bidding rules to other ways of placing orders
Since the 2000s electronic auctions have been actively used in public and private procurement in many countries. They are often organized by intermediaries – specialized e-platforms, which seem to raise price competition between companies through increased transparency and lower participation costs. Meanwhile, it is not clear yet to what consequences e-auctions lead, if an e-platform is corrupt. In this paper we examine how a corrupt e-platform affects favoritism in public procurement using a theoretical model of reverse outcry auction and e-auction. In both auction formats a public procurer can restrict participation of companies by setting contract requirements that all companies may not execute. In addition to this, in e-auction intermediary can block actions (i.e. bids) of companies. Manipulation of contract requirements and blocking bids provide an opportunity for public procurer and intermediary, respectively, to take bribes. We show that even if participation costs have no effect on the decision of companies to enter the auction, e-auction with a corrupt intermediary may lead to lower possibilities for favoritism than outcry auction. If the preferred bidder carries out low production costs, corruption of e-platform encourages favoritism. On the contrary, if the preferred bidder carries out high production costs and meets the strict requirements of the public procurer, incentives for favoritism and the size of the bribe may decrease. Thus, corruption of e-platform replaces the corruption of the public procurer and the society can benefit from it.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
In this paper we consider choice problems under the assumption that the preferences of the decision maker are expressed in the form of a parametric partial weak order without assuming the existence of any value function. We investigate both the sensitivity (stability) of each non-dominated solution with respect to the changes of parameters of this order, and the sensitivity of the set of non-dominated solutions as a whole to similar changes. We show that this type of sensitivity analysis can be performed by employing techniques of linear programming.