Интенсивность борьбы за ренту в модели производства и конфликта с неоднородными агентами
This paper presents the game-theoretic model of production and conflict (rent-seeking). It attempts to explain the empirically observed non monotonous relationship between, on the one hand, the rent-seeking intensity and, on the other hand, heterogeneity in asset ownership and quality of property rights protection. We show that there exists an “inverted-U” relationship between the aggregate expenditures on rent-seeking and institutional quality: gradual improvement in the quality of property rights may first lead to more intense rent-seeking, which de escalates after institutions develop beyond certain threshold level. Depending on the level of institutional quality, a movement towards more uniform distribution of assets can exercise both negative influence on economic growth and positive – on the intensity of conflict. We use the obtained results to interpret the historical cases of positive correlation between growth and rentseeking (developing countries in Asia in the second half of 20th century), and characterize the more and less favorable (in terms of rent-seeking costs) distributions of assets.