Привычка как точильный камень феноменологии
The article deals with the problem of habits and the possibilities of their phenomenological description. It is shown that the problem of habits is the key to phenomenology and sociology as a sciences of taken for granted, everyday world. The need to turn to phenomenological understanding of habit is determined by the fact that this notion was forced out of sociology to conceptual periphery, while phenomenology sustained an interest in habit as a subject of description. Nevertheless, phenomenological approach has a number of limitations due to the understanding of habit as an automatic and non-objectifiable bodily activity. On the basis of analysis of the practice of writing, it is shown that phenomenological understanding of habits should be supplemented by two components: the notion of habit as a way of ordering the external world and the notion of habit as an expanding competence. As a key concept for such a refined understanding of habits the concept of “empirical style” introduced by Husserl is proposed.
The volume contains the articles intitially held as talk at the conference "Is this real? Phenomenologies of the imaginary" at the Central-European Institute of Philosophy" (19-22.11.2013) as result of the research projects “Philosophical Investigations of the Body Experiences: Transdisciplinary Perspectives” (GAP 401/0/1164) and “Relevance of Subjectivity” (M300091201) in the Department of the Contemporary Continental Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, Prague.
In this work two philosophical concepts are being examined: “world-picture” of Ludwig Wittgenstein and “lifeworld” of Edmund Husserl. The aim of this work is to show that these two concepts have much in common.
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.
Several approaches to the concept of fatherhood present in Western sociological tradition are analyzed and compared: biological determinism, social constructivism and biosocial theory. The problematics of fatherhood and men’s parental practices is marginalized in modern Russian social research devoted to family and this fact makes the traditional inequality in family relations, when the father’s role is considered secondary compared to that of mother, even stronger. However, in Western critical men’s studies several stages can be outlined: the development of “sex roles” paradigm (biological determinism), the emergence of the hegemonic masculinity concept, inter-disciplinary stage (biosocial theory). According to the approach of biological determinism, the role of a father is that of the patriarch, he continues the family line and serves as a model for his ascendants. Social constructivism looks into man’s functions in the family from the point of view of masculine pressure and establishing hegemony over a woman and children. Biosocial theory aims to unite the biological determinacy of fatherhood with social, cultural and personal context. It is shown that these approaches are directly connected with the level of the society development, marriage and family perceptions, the level of egality of gender order.