This paper is devoted to Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a special type of philosophy (philosophizing), or the transcendental paradigm. For this purpose we introduce new methodological concepts as the transcendental shift, perspective and paradigm. The basis for our interpretation of transcendentalism is cognitive-semantic reading of the Critics and the theory of "two aspects". Transcendentalism is defined as a new «experimental» (Erfahrung) metaphysics and «transcendental» — as the intermedia domain (between the immanent and the transcendent) of reality, as the "instrumental" part of our cognition (consciousness).
The research deals with transformation of the subject matter of Husserl's phenomenology in Martin Heidegger's philosophy. The research explores why even with remarkably similar philosophic opinions shared by Husserl and Heidegger the latter had to give up his position of a teacher and to express differently the subject matter of the phenomenology. While answering this question, two approaches are undertaken. The first one deals with the phenomenology as transcendent philosophy: the research underlines that transcendental ego is a complicated matter, which eventually revealed itself as ultimate. The second approach calls for an entire change of the phenomenology. This approach embodies the fact that a taking-out-of-the-context method cannot be applicable for all areas of reality. Thus, the dimensions of reality that practical aspects deal with, including taking out of the context, are basically inaccessible for being taken out of the context. This is why the demand for Being comes to be essential. As a result of this demand, Husserl's phenomenology loses its position for, from now on, first, Being itself takes the place of transcendental I; second, intentionality appears to be an existential attitude; third, phenomenology as well as the truth gets a new meaning; forth, a concept of transcendental philosophy modifies substantially. Thus, the research explains the point that in passing over the basic settings of Husserl's philosophy it was crucial that Heidegger realized a priority role Being itself plays as regards to any means of Being, including pure consciousness.
Having considered in the context of educational subject, Heidegger's existential analytics of Dasein indicates that the epistemological issue of explanation is changing to the existential issue of understanding in Heidegger's ontology. Therefore Heidegger considers «education» in the sense of existential relation as the ability of Dasein to reach own being in its genuineness and entirety, which Dasein always anticipates in understanding. On this basis Heidegger defines education as transcending being, which he names «openness», similarly to Scheler.
This paper deals with the problem of the subject matter of M. Heidegger's phenomenological ontology. It explores why Heidegger had to give up his philosophical position of Husserl and to express the subject matter of phenomenology differently. The article also justifies the claim that in overcoming the initial tenets of Husserl's philosophy it was crucial that Heidegger realized the priority role Being itself plays as regards to the means of Being, including the being of consciousness.
Proceedings of the 12. International Kant Congress Nature and Freedom” (Vienna, 9/21/2015–9/25/2015). Ed. Violetta L. Waibel and Margit Ruffing. Berlin 2016.