Corporate Debt Overhang and Investment in Russia: The Role of Financial Conditions and Government Participation
The focus of this paper is the reasons of suboptimal investment policy that consists of over- or underinvestment. We consider the definitions of risk-shifting and risk avoidance effects that lead to suboptimal investments. These problems are connected with the agency conflicts in the firm between different parties: shareholders, debt holders and managers. Since the preferences of claimholders vary from one stage of the life-cycle to another, the incentives for over- and underinvestment differ in the stages of the life-cycle. The originality and the focus of this paper are the reasons for the exposure of overinvestment and underinvestment at different life-cycle stages. The research was conducted on a sample of Russian nonfinancial companies from the period 2003-2012. This sample was divided into three life-cycle stages: growth, maturity and decline. The method of life-cycle stages identification was modified in order to use only available data and make the model more business oriented. Risk-shifting and risk avoidance, as the reasons to the problem of suboptimal investment were studied. For this purpose the estimations with one of the effects were identified. The life-cycle stages, at which the effects took place, were determined, and also the strength of risk-shifting and risk avoidance was identified with the help of the regression analysis. In addition there was considered a way to mitigate these effects. According to the results they might be eliminated by the adjustment of short-term debt level.
This paper analyzes international high-skilled migration caused by financial frictions in educational market. I develop a model of learning in which acquisition of skill is only possible through personal interaction with a skilled individual; the income of the skilled is sensitive to financial constraints for the unskilled. Cross-country differences in such constraints have a multiplicative effect on the skill premium, causing outmigration of skilled individuals from a less developed country. I study welfare implications of such brain drain for the sending and receiving countries. Although it makes more difficult skill acquisition in the sending country, the unskilled may still be better off: increased cost of skill acquisition is offset by higher income once the skill has been acquired. For the receiving country, I identify a phenomenon of immiserizing immigration: a depletion of the stock of skill in the sending country due to brain drain hinders further production of skill, which may hurt the receiving country. Additionally, I find that increased openness of the sending country to migration and the resultant accelerated brain drain increase the incentives of the country government to reduce financial frictions.