We use so-called “Imputation Distribution Procedure” approach to sustain long-term cooperation in n-person multicriteria game in extensive form.
To ensure sustainable cooperation in multistage games with vector payoffs we use the payment schedule based approach. The main dynamic properties of cooperative solutions used in single-criterion multistage games are extended to multicriteria games.
We design two recurrent payment schedules that satisfy such advantageous properties as the efficiency and the time consistency conditions, non-negativity and irrational behavior proofness.
Using some specific approach to the coalition-consistency analysis in n-person multicriteria games we introduce two re¯nements of (weak Pareto) equilibria: the strong and strictly strong (n-1)-equilibriums. Axiomatization of the strictly strong (n-1)-equilibria (on closed families of multicriteria games) is provided in terms of consistency, strong one-person rationality, suitable variants of Pareto optimality and converse consistency axiom and others
Using A-optimality concept for vector-valued maximization, we propose a refinement of Pareto equilibria in n-person multicriteria games. The theorems on existence of A-equilibria and subgame perfect Aequilibria are derived. Time consistency of A-equilibria in extensive multicriteria games with perfect and incomplete information is proved.