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Indecent Disclosures: Anticorruption Reforms and Political Selection
Does the passage of anticorruption reforms affect the types of people that want to serve in government? Thisarticle evaluates the effects of a common tool to fight corruption—financial disclosures—using data on 25,642 electionsin Putin-era Russia. I argue that financial disclosures function like a personal audit, generating information for journal-ists and prosecutors to investigate illicit gains earned inside and outside of government. Exploiting staggered elections, Ifind that requiring financial disclosures leads to roughly 25% fewer incumbents seeking reelection and 10% fewer candi-dates with suspicious financial histories. Greater media freedom and law enforcement capacity further increase the risk ofcorruption and tax evasion being uncovered, resulting in even fewer candidacies from those criminally exposed. Increas-ing transparency changes the incentives for serving in elected office, even in settings where other political motives may beat play.