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Координация усилий и распространение информации

Khovanskaya I. A., Sonin K.
This note provides a simple example that additional information made available to competing researchers in an R&D laboratory might decrease the overall probability of discovery, i.e. harm social welfare. If agents have only vague prior information on which project is more likely to succeed, the probability that the discovery is made is higher than in the case when the agents are provided with some noisy public signal. Thus, a laboratory principal might strategically choose to withheld some information from the subordinate researchers. If one researcher in a laboratory chooses a research portfolio first, she might strategically opt for some inferior projects in order to avoid excessive competition by other fellow researchers.