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Феноменологическое прозрение Г. Гарфинкеля: работа с конститутивным социальным порядком
The article explicates phenomenological prerequisites for understanding the constitutive social order. The main premise of the work is that the theoretical basis of the constitutive social order, the understanding of which is proposed in Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, can be analyzed from the positions of phenomenological philosophy. The aim of the article is to analyze the theoretical presuppositions and the way of knowing the constitutive social order. The optics of phenomenological philosophy are chosen for the analysis of presuppositions because it is the optics that Garfinkel addresses in his works not only directly, but also through the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz. The main text of the article is divided into two semantic blocks. The first section attempts to define an understanding of phenomenology as phenomenological practice. This is necessary because Garfinkel himself regarded phenomenology as a model for working with current background expectations that constitute an actual reproducible order. For reflection on the problem of phenomenological practice, we turn to Edmund Husserl, Lothar Eley, and Eugen Fink, taking into account the analytical works of contemporary researchers. As a result, we emphasize the main attributes of the so understood phenomenology. The second section offers an analysis of the basic philosophical premises of the constitutive social order, relying on the previously defined understanding of phenomenological philosophy. The structure of the subject of ethnomethodology proposed in Garfinkel’s early works is analyzed, as well as the main epistemological limitations that determine the specificity of cognition in ethnomethodology. The problem of cognitive process, determined by the requirement of coherence of experience without reference to a privileged topicality, is singled out separately. Cognition in the proposed optics is based on the principle of contextual obviousness. The limitation of cognition of ethnomethodology and phenomenology oriented on the problem of givenness, caused by the closedness of phenomenal idealization, determines isomorphism in their practical implementation