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Внутренний реализм Х. Патнэма как прагматически обоснованная концепция
This article is an attempt to find a new way of justifying H. Putnam’s conception of
internal realism and, more broadly, any conceptions that use nontraditional (weakened) forms
of realism. The main idea of the article is that the adoption of this or some similar conception
is already justified by the pragmatic need to preserve epistemology as a scientific discipline
and social practice. In order to show this, in the first half of the article we make a brief
excursion into the history of the development of the concept of justification in philosophy in
general and in the philosophy of pragmatism in particular and reveal the essence of the dispute
of W. Clifford and W. James about the ethics of belief. Then we trace the development of
this dispute in the later pragmatism and reveal the ethical background of the modern dispute
between realists and anti-realists, based on the discussion of H. Putnam and R. Rorty around
the notion of truth. In the second half of the article, we articulate a pragmatic argument in
favor of Putnam’s realistic position and outline the basics of his conception of internal realism.
In conclusion, we reveal the pragmatic significance of Putnam’s conception as a means of
preserving epistemology in its classic normative form, while being freed from many overly
optimistic and tendentious assumptions of the classical period.