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Russian and Georgian Operations in South Ossetia, August 7–12, 2008
THE EVENTS OF THE FIVE-DAY WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND the former Soviet republic of Georgia are rooted in the history of the Transcaucasia (South Caucasus) region. Some relate to the seven decades of the USSR and even earlier history, while others can be traced to the chaotic developments emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In this chapter, we analyze information warfare during the conflict in South Ossetia, between August 8 and 12, 2008. Based on publicly available interviews and documents, we consider the Georgian and Russian information operations before, during, and after the conflict. What emerges from this brief investigation is what the Russians learned about information operations from this conflict: (1) the value in mobilizing activists to multiple the impact of official messaging;
(2) the continuing high demand for, and supporting role of combat footage; (3) the value of embedded civilian correspondents; (4) the speed and flexibility of small news agencies; and (5) the power of cultural contrasts.
This conflict is widely regarded as a failure of Russia in terms of information operations despite the military success. Postconflict analysis has brought about systemic changes in how information warfare is understood and approached. The lessons learned were practiced and further developed in subsequent conflicts, including Ukraine and Syria.