Метаэтические основания аргументов от зла

Философский журнал. 2021. Т. 14. № 2. С. 123–137.

Mishura A.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the metaethical assumptions of arguments from evil (AE). In the first part of the paper, I discuss the main conceptual ingredients of AE: di - vine attributes and the concepts of gratuitous and horrendous evil. Then, I argue that AE are incompatible with metaethical antirealism because their premises might be true in the relevant sense only on realistic assumptions. I further argue that metaethical naturalism makes AE circular and metaethical supernaturalism renders them incoherent. The only form of realism that seems compatible with the arguments from evil, as I argue, is non - naturalism. In the second part of the paper, I argue that although coherentism might be used to construe arguments from evil, it makes such arguments dialectically weak be - cause it seems more rational for a theist to deny the reality of gratuitous and horren dous evil then to deny the reality of God. I further show that moral intuitionism might explain why the denial of these kinds of evil might be difficult for theists. In the third part of the paper, I argue that the arguments from evil presuppose an external relation between moral judgements and motives as well as an indefeasible necessary relation between reasons and motives in God

Keywords: философия религии, philosophy of religion, God, metaethics, метаэтика, theism, теизм, problem of evil, проблема зла, аргументы от зла, бытие Бога